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TRANSLATIONS ON VIETNAM

No. 1854

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party published in Hanoi

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ESTABLISHING THE CORRECT VIEWPOINTS ON THE PART OF CADRES AND PARTY MEMBERS
AND IMPROVING THEIR ABILITIES AND QUALITIES

Hanoi HOC TAP in Vietnamese No 9, Sep 76 pp 11-49

[Article by Nguyen Duy Trinh; a translation of this article, translated from Hanoi Domestic Radio broadcasts, was published in FBIS Asia and Pacific DAILY REPORT, Vol IV, No 182, 17 Sep 76, pp K2-K8; No 183, 20 Sep 76, pp K4-K10; No 184, 21 Sep 76, pp K3-K6; No 186, 23 Sep 76, pp K7-K11; No 188, 27 Sep 76, pp K14-K17; No 189, 28 Sep 76, pp K13-K16; No 191, 30 Sep 76, pp K7-K14, No 193, 4 Oct 76, pp K9-K12; No 194, 5 Oct 76, pp K4-K11]

[Text] With the victory in the spring of 1975, //the Vietnamese revolution entered a new stage.// The entering of a new stage by the revolution demands a revolutionary change on the part of our party, the entire dictatorship of the proletariat system, the nation, and each cadre and party member as well as each citizen within our country.

This change must first occur within the party in order to change all of society because, as Uncle Ho frequently said: "The party member leads, the country follows."

Each of our cadres and party members must truly enter a new stage within himself, a new stage in the development of his viewpoints, abilities and qualities. From the shift of the revolution to a new stage, we must draw necessary conclusions concerning the methods of thinking and working of each party committee echelon, of each of us. The shift of the revolution to a new stage must be deeply expressed in each aspect of social life, in each field of the revolutionary undertaking, and lead to new advances, new achievements.

I. The New Stage of the Revolution Throughout the Country

//The significance and specifics of the revolution's shift to a new stage://

The revolution's shift to a new stage first of all means a change in the strategic task of the revolution. The resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum stated: //"The strategic task// of the revolution in our country in the new stage is: completing the reunification of the country and rapidly, strongly, and steadily advancing the entire country to socialism..."

The central slogan "everything for the frontlines, everything for victory" has been replaced by the slogan //"everything for production, everything for socialist construction, everything for the prosperity and strength of the fatherland, the happiness of the people."//

This is the historic turning point which President Ho predicted more than one-half century ago when he pointed out: //"The only course for saving the country and liberating the nation is the course of the proletarian revolution"(1)// and "only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and workers of the world from the yoke of slavery."(2) This is the revolutionary change which our party pointed out 46 years ago in the 1930 Political Platform of the Party: "The Vietnamese revolution, under the leadership of the party, will bypass the stage of capitalist development and endeavor to advance directly to socialism."

With this shift by the revolution to a new stage, our entire party and all our people shift from the period in which the foremost task was fighting the enemy to save the nation to the new stage in which //the central task is organizing and managing the independent, reunified country// and advancing to socialism. The resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum set forth the fundamental aspects of the socialist revolution throughout the country. It emphasized: "They are also the fundamental aspects of the sharp and complex class struggle to resolve the problem of 'who defeats whom' which exists between socialism and capitalism in the period of transition to socialism in our country. This struggle is being carried out by many different forms: reform and construction; politics and economics; persuasion and compulsion; peace and violence. It demands that all our cadres and party members //have a new determination, new abilities, the necessary knowledge, and correct work methods// in each field, possess the revolutionary-offensive spirit, and resolutely struggle for the total victory of socialism."

In conjunction with the change in the strategic task, the shift of the revolution to a new stage has brought about major changes in the fundamental characteristics of the country's situation.

The resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum analyzed the three special characteristics of the development of our country's revolution in the new stage. On the basis of these three special characteristics and in order to give some thought to the specifics involved in the revolution's shift to a new stage, we have presented the following several matters worthy of attention:

--We have shifted from war time to peace time and the advance by the entire country to socialism, that is, we have shifted from having to apply two types of laws at once, the laws of revolutionary war and economic laws, to //only applying economic laws within economic activities and economic management.// This is a very profound change: many of the elements of the organization and management of the economy in past years, which were of necessity designed to insure victory, are not suitable today; the shortcomings which were difficult to avoid during the war and were temporarily ignored by the people cannot be tolerated today; many programs and measures which were researched and, in some

cases, even tested in pilot projects to gain experience for establishing the structure of the economy and the socialist mode of economic management, but could not be implemented because the necessary conditions did not exist, have become a pressing demand now that these conditions do exist.

--We have shifted from a country partitioned by neo-colonialism, a country one-half of which was ruled by neo-colonialism to an independent and reunified country advancing to socialism which means that, from now on and in every large and small matter pertaining to the revolutionary undertaking, we must always have a nationwide point of view, the point of view of a country with a population of 50 million, with 330,000 square kilometers of territory, with a 3,200 kilometer coastline, with 10 million hectares of arable land, and with all the natural resources, material and spiritual forces, strength of the traditions, and the revolutionary fervor of the people of the entire country. This very profound change demands that each cadre, be he from northern Vietnam or southern Vietnam, broaden his vision, improve his method of thinking, and change both the content and mode of his activities.

In the new stage of the revolution, our people have new advantages and are experiencing new difficulties. Correctly evaluating these advantages and difficulties is an objective requirement in order to do a good job of changing the revolutionary stage.

Briefly stated, our //advantages// are:

--The correct leadership of the party; the strong dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the country; the patriotism, socialist awareness, bravery, intelligence, and creativity of the people; and the enthusiasm resulting from victory;

--The rich, diverse natural resources of the country; the rather large production capacity in southern Vietnam, and the corps of management cadres, scientific and technical cadres, and skilled manual workers who have been trained;

--The experiences of the 21 years of the socialist revolution and socialist construction in northern Vietnam; this will be a particular advantage of our country when the entire country shifts to the new strategic task of advancing to socialism;

--Basically favorable international circumstances and the heightened international position and prestige of our country open fine prospects for the development of international cooperation between our country and the fraternal and other countries.

Briefly stated, our //difficulties// are:

--The material and technical base as well as the level of development of production are low; the remnants of the old system are still severe and the aftereffects of neo-colonialism and the war are still serious; the economy is

unbalanced in several very basic areas and, during the past year, a number of these imbalances temporarily worsened when many sources of materials for production and commodities for everyday life suddenly declined or dried up; social production throughout the country is in urgent need of being reorganized; socialist industrialization demands large sources of capital (including foreign currency) at a time when the working people of the country are encountering many difficulties in their everyday lives and several aspects of their standard of living must be urgently improved.

--The level of organization and management, which was low compared to the requirements of the task during the preceding stage, is even lower compared to the requirements of shifting to the new stage; the abilities and knowledge of cadres and party members in both northern and southern Vietnam, especially southern Vietnam, are greatly lacking compared to the new task;

--On the one hand, economic relations with foreign countries offer many new advantages; on the other hand, they involve a change: beginning now, we must, basically speaking, shift from relations based primarily on non-repayable aid to relations of mutual cooperation; and, to increase imports, to import precious materials which we need very much, we must rapidly develop payment forces of high value and large volume. In the past, southern Vietnam lived completely on investments made under the signboard of U.S. aid; this situation no longer exists.

We have not evaluated our advantages too highly. However, we have not yet fully calculated which jobs must be done, have not yet determined how much time will be needed, and do not yet have the ability to transform these advantages from potentials into reality.

The majority of our advantages are still in the form of potentials. However, there are some types of potentials which cannot be developed for a long time, such as the potentials of petroleum and natural gas, electric power from the rivers, and many types of minerals or a number of potentials of a basic nature in agriculture and the tropical forests, and so forth. Besides these, there are types of potentials which can be developed much earlier, such as existing production capacity and the existing economic base, the existing labor force, the existing capabilities of agriculture, fishing, and forestry, the capability for northern and southern Vietnam supplementing each other, etc.

As regards our difficulties, although we are fully aware of all the difficulties we face, we failed, during the past year, to fully measure the specific extent of the difficulties in a number of areas. For this reason, our thinking, determination, and measures to overcome these difficulties have not been commensurate with the extent of these difficulties. Recently, we realized this and are now taking corrective action.

Some difficulties are long range in nature and must be gradually overcome in the process of advancing to socialism. But there are also difficulties which are temporary, included among which are many difficulties which should

not even exist, such as the difficulties presently being encountered with a number of types of raw materials, grain, food products, and consumer goods, difficulties which would not have been as serious as they are now if we had assessed the situation better and provided better management.

//Reviewing our work//:

During the past year, we performed many large jobs of strategic significance in northern Vietnam, in southern Vietnam, throughout the country.

We completed the reunification of the country in terms of state administration and, at the same time, reunified the revolutionary mass organizations and are about to reunify the National Front. In particular, the brilliant success of the recent general election proved the desire for reunification and the high revolutionary awareness of the people throughout our country, proved that the people of southern Vietnam unanimously selected the course of building an independent, reunified, and socialist Vietnam.

Since the day the revolution entered the new stage, the situation in southern Vietnam has undergone good changes. The political and economic situations have gradually been stabilized, the people of southern Vietnam are united and enthusiastically contributing to the construction of the new system. Each revolutionary activity has made progress and is on a strong forward momentum in which //strongpoints and achievements predominate.// The victories which have been achieved prove the correctness of the lines and policies set forth by the party. These victories also prove the revolutionary spirit, the creativity, and the new level of maturity of the cadres, party members, and people of southern Vietnam and the great and timely contributions made in every area by socialist northern Vietnam.

During the past year, the shift to the new stage of the revolution profoundly affected all activities in northern Vietnam and was marked by new efforts, new progress and achievements in the effort to meet many of the suddenly increased requirements of the revolutionary undertaking throughout the country.

The past year was one of very urgent efforts by socialist northern Vietnam: marked advances were made in implementing the 1975 state plan and the plan for the first 6 months of 1976.

//In agriculture,// despite repeated natural disasters, the harvests during 1975 were good harvests and, in 1976, the amount of area under the cultivation of rice, subsidiary food crops, and a number of industrial crops has increased over 1975. The movement to improve farmland water conservancy systems was accelerated and about one-third the districts in northern Vietnam completed their farmland water conservancy improvement plans.

//In industry,// output value increased 18 percent during the first 6 months of 1976 compared to first 6 months of 1975. High percentages of the plans for the production of a number of important products, such as metal products, coal, iron, cement, silk cloth, and so forth were completed. In many industrial

enterprises, initial changes were made in economic management, labor discipline, and labor productivity.

//In construction// marked progress was made in construction and assembly work at many construction sites and the rate of construction of a number of key projects was rather high.

//In the supply of materials,// we made a very great effort to increase imports under the conditions of not much of an increase in exports; the agencies in charge of the domestic supply of materials and the communications-transportation sector also made many efforts.

//In the circulation of consumer goods,// the supply of consumer goods in accordance with state standards to manual and office workers was somewhat improved in a few municipalities and industrial areas where distribution was fairer and more correct in terms of the persons to whom consumer goods were distributed.

In //the relationship between state agencies and the people,// the implementation of the Premier's directive concerning combating bureaucracy, officialdom, and practices which bother the people achieved initial, encouraging results.

Under the conditions of material forces and produced wealth which were still greatly limited, the state made distinct efforts to //improve the standard of living// of the people by promoting manual and office workers, increasing the bonus fund for manual workers, gradually adjusting the prices of a number of essential consumer goods, distributing consumer goods in a fair and reasonable manner, etc.

The advances mentioned above are the //results of improving state management,// the management of society. Although the change in this field has been slow and has been neither uniform nor strong, it is a change for which we have been preparing for many years, a change which has only begun to be seen in 1976.

In order to more fully see the efforts and progress of northern Vietnam, it is necessary to review the results of the 3-year (1973-1975) post-war economic reconstruction and development task and look back a little further:

The socialist //production relations// were constantly consolidated and expanded, thereby providing a firm foundation for the implementation of the task of engaging in production and supporting the frontlines. The percentage of national income comprised by the socialist economic segment increased from 62.7 percent in 1960 to 88 percent in 1975.

//The economic installations// heavily damaged by the war were rapidly restored and developed somewhat, thereby causing economic potential to exceed the highest pre-war level. In 1975, the value of the fixed assets in the production sector increased five times compared to 1960 and 2.5 times

compared to 1965. The production capacity of all the industrial sectors exceeded pre-war levels; electric power production capacity increased 2.4 times, chemical fertilizer production capacity increased 2.5 times, and machine output increased 2.5 times. Within agriculture, irrigation was provided for nearly 90 percent of the area transplanted with rice and drainage projects were constructed for nearly one-half of the area which is generally waterlogged. The districts of the lowlands and midlands and a number of mountain districts were equipped with tractor stations or units. The cooperatives were widely equipped with many of the small machines used within agriculture. In communications and transportation, the total length of railroad lines and roads was greatly increased compared to the pre-war period and we equipped with many more means of transportation.

//The corps of technical cadres and workers// grew rapidly and became a large force. In 1975, the number of cadres with a college or post-graduate education was 33 times greater than in 1960 and 6 times greater compared to 1965. The number of cadres who graduated from vocational middle schools increased 21 times compared to 1960 and 4 times compared to 1965. The number of technical workers increased 7 times compared to 1960 and 2.5 times compared to 1965. At present, we have 3,000 cadres who have a post-graduate education, 160,000 cadres with a college education, 350,000 cadres who have graduated from vocational middle school, and nearly 1 million technical workers; this is a valuable asset in building the economy and making rapid progress in science and technology.

On the basis of restoring and developing the material and technical bases, //the level of production// of the economy and each sector increased markedly. In 1975, the gross social product increased 42 percent compared to 1965, national income increased 28 percent, industrial output value increased 74 percent, agricultural output value increased 4 percent (this level of increase is still very low), the volume of construction and assembly work increased 83 percent, and the volume of commodities circulated increased 2.5 times. In 1975, the output of practically all of the important products met and surpassed pre-war levels. In addition, a number of new products were produced, such as rolled steel, nitrogen fertilizer, dredgers, tractors, fishing boats, etc.

//Education, public health services, cultural activities, and art activities// developed strongly. The general school enrollment during the 1975-1976 school year was 2.8 times higher than enrollment during the 1960-1961 school year and the number of middle school and college students was more than 3 times higher. In 1975, there were more than twice as many hospital beds and more than 12 times as many doctors and physicians as there were in 1960.

Throughout the years of the war and during the period of economic reconstruction, //the material life// of the people, although it involved many difficulties, did not involve any major upheavals. Basic food, clothing, education, and health care needs were met. The people purchased more than 70 percent of their essential consumer goods from the organized market at stable prices. //The spiritual and cultural lives// of the people developed in a wholesome manner.

As northern Vietnam was beginning to industrialize its very underdeveloped economy, it was heavily attacked during the war and had to fulfill its obligation to the great frontlines as the great rear area. Yet, through self-reliance and by making good use of international assistance, northern Vietnam fulfilled the task of the great rear area, won glorious victories over the two wars of destruction waged by the U.S. imperialists, wholeheartedly supported the great frontlines, and, together with southern Vietnam, won total victory in the undertaking to complete the liberation of the nation. Northern Vietnam maintained its production and economic potential, developed them in some areas, and, at the same time, virtually maintained the standard of living of the people.

These are very great achievements, achievements deserving of pride by the people of our entire country.

When the revolution shifted to the new stage throughout the country and while accelerating socialist construction and continuing to improve the socialist production relations, northern Vietnam actively helped take over the management of and guide the various jobs being performed in southern Vietnam, thereby rapidly stabilizing the political situation, the economic situation, everyday life, and so forth in southern Vietnam. Northern Vietnam directly provided southern Vietnam with material forces and shared its cadres and workers with southern Vietnam.

With regard to socialist northern Vietnam, the shift to the new stage requires assuming an increased responsibility, making a greater effort, making faster progress, quickly rectifying shortcomings, and making higher demands of itself in every area.

During the past year, in the spirit of giving the best to southern Vietnam, //northern Vietnam comprehensively reinforced southern Vietnam in every field// in order to begin carrying out socialist reform in a manner closely linked to socialist construction.

Also during the past year, the extremely large and basic changes which occurred in southern Vietnam //had a strong effect upon, bolstered the spirit of, and resulted in material assistance to socialist northern Vietnam.//

The revolutionary successes in southern Vietnam are successes achieved and enjoyed by the people of the entire country. In production, construction, and transportation, some equipment and machinery and a portion of the production capacity of the enterprises in southern Vietnam were mobilized to supplement northern Vietnam; the enterprises in southern Vietnam began to cooperate in production with enterprises in northern Vietnam, thereby helping northern Vietnam resolve a number of problems. With regard to consumer goods, a number of sources of goods in which southern Vietnam is strong effectively helped northern Vietnam, thereby increasing the supply of consumer goods to workers.

All of the advances we have made in southern Vietnam, even if they do not have a direct, immediate effect upon northern Vietnam, are contributions by southern Vietnam to the revolution of the entire country, contributions which benefit the people of the entire country.

On the basis of the realities of the past year and more, we can make several general observations:

1. To begin with, these successes originated in thoroughly carrying out the shift of the revolution to the new stage and thoroughly implementing the lines and policies of the party in the new stage. Success has been achieved wherever, whenever, and in whatever field this has been done to one extent or another. Difficulties have been encountered wherever, whenever, and in whatever field this has not been done to one extent or another.

2. We must develop the organizational and management ability demanded by the new stage of the revolution. During the past year, our strength in this area was developed but our weaknesses and deficiencies, which were very clearly evident, posed major obstacles to mobilizing the masses to fully carry out the line of the party.

3. The new stage of the revolution not only poses a challenge to us in terms of our viewpoints, lines, and organizational and management ability, it also poses a challenge in terms of our revolutionary qualities. In this area, the basic strongpoints of our corps of cadres have been clearly displayed; however, the shortcomings and weaknesses which exist demand that we make efforts to correct them.

In all three areas, the area of viewpoints and lines, the area of organizational and management ability, and the area of revolutionary qualities, that is, in terms of the overall ability of the communist party member in the new stage of the revolution, we must show ourselves to be worthy of "being the leader and truly loyal servant of the people" as advised by President Ho.

II. A Number of Viewpoints Concerning the New Task and the Programs and Measures for Completing It Well

Comprehensively and fully stated, the viewpoints and understandings concerning applying the general line of the party in the new stage of the revolution are very rich; they deal with everything from the general to the specific and encompass all fields of revolutionary activities, all aspects of social life. Here, we have presented a number of selected points of a key nature.

Rapidly completing the reunification of the country in every respect:

The resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum pointed out: "The reunification of the country is the most frequent aspiration of the people of the entire country as well as an objective law of the development of the Vietnamese revolution, of the history of the Vietnamese nation." This resolution also emphasized: "The struggles of our people under the leadership of the party

for //independence, reunification, and socialism// are closely linked together, they are struggles which are both national and class struggles in nature." The political report delivered by Le Duan on behalf of the Party Central Committee to the recent session of the 6th National Assembly read in part: "Only socialism can bring about the fullest possible reunification of our fatherland: territorial reunification, political and spiritual reunification, economic, cultural, and social reunification, reunification in terms of rights and obligations, reunification in which everyone is truly united and has a deep love for one another.

Today, for each Vietnamese, loving the country means loving socialism, devoting all of one's enthusiasm, energy, intelligence, and talent to building the socialist fatherland."(3)

At present, the reunification of the country and socialism are inextricably linked; therefore, the more rapidly we complete the reunification of the country in every respect, the faster, more strongly, and more steadily we can advance the entire country to socialism; and, the more the socialist revolution is accelerated throughout the country, the faster we can complete the reunification of the state in every respect.

Today, following countless sacrifices by the entire nation and the elimination of the 17th parallel as a border between North and South, it is gradually being realized that there is no reason for the concept of northern Vietnam and southern Vietnam to exist, that there is even less of a reason for the existence of the old concept of northern Vietnam, central Vietnam, and southern Vietnam, and that the reunification of our fatherland, our nation will achieve a higher level in the socialist system.

Completing the reunification of the country in no way means failing to take into consideration the special characteristics of each locality, failing to consider the actual socio-economic situation of the provinces in southern Vietnam. The line of the party demands that we creatively apply the experiences of northern Vietnam in the provinces of southern Vietnam, not mechanically duplicate the stages of development and methods of northern Vietnam. In contrast to northern Vietnam which carried out socialist reform before building the material and technical base of socialism (although these two aspects still had to be coordinated), today, under the new circumstances of the entire country, southern Vietnam must, from the very outset, simultaneously carry out socialist reform and socialist construction, these two aspects are inextricably linked.

At present, we have, generally speaking, completed the reunification of the country in terms of state administration; however, many jobs must still be done to fully complete the reunification of the country in terms of state administration. At the same time, it is necessary to complete reunification in all other areas and achieve an increasingly high level of reunification; of basic importance in this regard is the need to actively bring the economy of southern Vietnam within the orb of socialism and quickly making the economies of both zones identical within large-scale socialist production.

To complete the reunification of the country, the provinces and central agencies as well as the various echelons in southern Vietnam must actively research and promptly resolve numerous very important problems, otherwise they will become stagnant, retard the development of the potential for southern and northern Vietnam to supplement each other, retard the development of the comprehensive strength of the fatherland.

Of decisive significance is the need to establish and properly implement a plan for restoring and developing the economy and culture of the entire country. At the same time, it is necessary to soon promulgate management policies and regulations expressed in the laws of social management and unified economic management of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (in this work, we must re-examine, supplement, and revise the necessary features of current laws). We must rapidly implement the Party Central Committee's policy of the four state administrative echelons to unify the organization and supervision of implementation. We must actively resolve the problems involved in exchanges between northern and southern Vietnam in the fields of production, circulation, distribution, consumption, financial payments, monetary matters, etc.

//The viewpoint concerning the economic line and task://

To begin with, it is necessary to //establish the new position and role of the task of organizing and managing the national economy.// According to the viewpoint of scientific socialism, economic activities are always social activities of a fundamental nature and, in the final analysis, play the decisive role. In our country today, in addition to their position as the foundation, in addition to their ultimately decisive role, economic activities have been the central task, the most important political task ever since we shifted to the slogan "everything for production, everything for socialist construction."

In the shift to the new stage, there must be a change in all activities with the most basic and profound change occurring in the field of economic activities. In this field, not only the content and modes of activities, but also the position and role of the economy in all of the activities of the revolution must change. From now on, all production and economic activities will take the place of the activities involved in fighting the enemy to save the nation during the previous stage.

If we fail to recognize this fact, we will be unable to realize the true nature of the shift to the new stage of the revolution.

Economic tasks and activities can only play a central role in the new stage if they //are closely coordinated with the other fields// and develop the role they play as the foundation in order to accelerate and support the other activities and, at the same time, win the support of the economy by the other fields. All the other fields of activity must also orient their efforts toward supporting and accelerating the good completion of the economic task and, in this manner, develop their own activities. If economic and other activities are separated and not coordinated the revolutionary undertaking

will be seriously harmed. One characteristic of the new stage is the abundance and complexity of the economic, political and social relations which have developed throughout the country and within each sector and locality. Now, more than ever before, we must view the whole, we must realize what is of central importance while maintaining a comprehensive point of view, we must adhere to the tasks of primary, immediate importance while recognizing the tasks of decisive, long-range significance. With regard to southern Vietnam, the resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum points out: "In the immediate future, //it is necessary to direct the spearhead of the struggle primarily at the counter-revolutionary forces presently conducting acts of sabotage and the compradore bourgeoisie. However, it is necessary to adhere to the task of socialist industrialization because building the system of large-scale socialist production is the long-range task, it is the task of most decisive significance in the total victory of the socialism."//

In building the socialist economic system of the entire country, we must fully understand the //relationship between socialist reform and socialist construction.// The resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum emphasizes: we must always "closely coordinate reform and construction in the process of carrying out the revolution and in the fields of politics, economics, technology, the culture, and ideology within the scope of society and each unit." This basic thinking must be thoroughly implemented throughout the country.

The realities in northern Vietnam over the past many years and the new lessons learned in southern Vietnam during the past year clearly show that whenever reform and construction are separated or even only slightly lacking in coordination in any field, we will display shortcomings and encounter difficulties.

Between 1958 and 1960, northern Vietnam rapidly and systematically established the system of public ownership (national and collective ownership) of the primary instruments of production. As a result, production capacity underwent a marked stage of development for several consecutive years.

However, at one point, we prematurely declared that socialist reform had virtually been completed; for this reason, we were somewhat lax in our efforts to continue to strengthen and improve the new production relations; in particular, we gave light attention to reforming the old and building the new in distribution relations, gave light attention to organizing the relations among the classes and among the collectives of workers in the process of business and production, light attention which was reflected in matters pertaining to organization and management; we even failed to give full attention to maintaining and strengthening the system of public ownership of the instruments of production.

Another serious shortcoming and lesson worth remembering is that we did not closely coordinate reform and construction: when we saw negative phenomena resulting from these shortcomings, we were slow to determine their source; we were unaware of the close relationship and unity between production

relations and production forces, between socialist reform and socialist construction; and we were slow to develop effective corrective measures to strengthen and improve the socialist production relations and accelerate socialist construction.

Within agriculture, the socialist production relations did not develop in keeping with the development of production capacity; these two aspects were not closely linked together within an efficient reorganization of production; therefore, the collective production relations could not be constantly strengthened and improved, production capacity developed slowly, cooperatives were not strong, and even some of the successes we had achieved diminished somewhat. During one period of time, many cooperatives disbanded or existed only in name and many bad practices developed among cooperatives, practices which affected the fulfillment of their obligations to the state, violated the land rights of the collective, limited the results of production, violated the right of collective ownership of cooperative members, and adversely affected the work spirit and attitude and the labor productivity of the cooperative member. While we were trying to correct this negative aspect, there was a tendency to only give attention to production relations, thus, we were going around in circles unable to find a solution. On the other hand, many efforts were made to strengthen the material-technical base of the cooperative and introduce machines in the countryside but these were individual efforts not coordinated with the improvement of production relations, consequently, these efforts did not yield the good results desired nor were the results achieved commensurate with the efforts made.

As regards the artisan and handicraft industry, after organizing cooperatives we failed to give full attention to improving and equipping them with technology, to organizing their production in sectors consisting of both state-operated enterprises and cooperatives, or to organizing them on the basis of areas; we did not manage cooperatives well from the supply of raw materials and the organization of production to the consumption of their products; we frequently provided loose management which opened many loopholes which allowed cooperatives and handicraftsmen to engage in many negative activities, such as pilfering materials and doing sloppy, careless work; there were also "phantom" cooperatives which existed in name only and which, in fact, represented exploitative relations. In the face of these negative phenomena, many comrades failed to see the shortcomings which existed and the reasons for them; they did not coordinate reform and construction; they viewed the artisan and handicraft cooperatives and artisans and handicraftsmen as unreliable organizations and persons who were ready to avail themselves of every opportunity to benefit from socialism; therefore, they failed to notice the necessity to reorganize production, improve the management system, and improve the mode of operation and the relationship between the state-operated industrial and commercial enterprises and the artisan and handicraft cooperatives; these comrades simply advocated "putting everything under lock and key" to the point where the volume of products decreased and many sources of goods dried up, thereby causing the state and the cooperatives as well to incur losses.

As regards small businessmen, because we did not closely link the reform of small businessmen with the reorganization of production, did not provide suitable jobs to persons displaced from their jobs, and did not employ those persons who could be used in the network of state stores and market cooperatives, we failed to resolve this problem well even though we conducted many reform drives and many administrative inspections.

As regards capitalist and private industry and commerce, after employing suitable forms and stages to carry out reform in the area of the system of ownership, we stood still for a rather long period of time and were slow to incorporate the reformed enterprises in the organization of production of the various economic and technical sectors.

During recent years, we have gained experience, set forth programs, and are endeavoring to closely coordinate reform and construction. The results which have been achieved very clearly prove the correctness of the above mentioned policy.

In the close coordination of reform and construction, construction is the key factor and reform is an extremely important factor. Construction here means building a new socialist society, the most basic aspect of which is building the material and technical base; however, they must be built within a close relationship between the material-technical base and the socialist production relations. Reform here means the reform of the old society, the most basic feature of which is reforming the old production relations; however, they must be reformed in a close relationship between production relations and production forces.

If we only emphasize reform and fail to fully realize the key role played by construction, we will not only overlook the construction task and fail to develop a system of large-scale socialist production, the base of the socialist system, but we will also fail to carry out reform well. If we only emphasize construction and do not see the very important role played by reform, we will not only create many loopholes in reform, but also be unable to carry out construction well. Every deviation in any area is wrong and harmful. Construction and reform must always be closely linked together, to carry out construction, it is necessary to carry out reform and vice versa.

Our objective is to build the new but the old lingers on, it is stubborn and never vanishes from social life on its own, rather, it resists the new by every possible means; therefore, we cannot simply carry out construction, we must coordinate construction with reform. We definitely must reform the old; however, if we only worry about and cope with the old and fail to actively build the new, we will have neither the strength to defeat the old nor a superior standard to serve as a basis for converting the old; therefore, we cannot only carry out reform, reform must be coordinated with construction.

This very basic viewpoint must be thoroughly implemented in all of our activities.

We must fully understand the relationships among the primary economic sectors of the national economy, beginning with the relationship between industry and agriculture.

The party's socialist economic construction line, which was first set forth in the resolution passed by the 3rd National Congress and later developed upon in the resolutions of the Party Central Committee, is now as follows: "Giving priority to the rational development of heavy industry on the basis of agricultural and light industrial development, correctly coordinating industry and agriculture..."

This line reflects the very close relationship between industry and agriculture in the entire course of building the socialist economy in our country. Of pressing importance, and what we have been trying to do for a long time, is correctly establishing the specific contents of this line for the years to come.

The experiences of northern Vietnam, which have been illuminated by the shift to the new stage throughout the country and by the new characteristics of and new developments in the domestic and world economic situations, have helped us gradually more clearly see the relationship between industry and agriculture. This is reflected in a passage of the report by Le Duan before the recent session of the National Assembly dealing with "the primary direction of our efforts to restore and develop the economy in our country":

In the relationship between industry and agriculture, industry, primarily heavy industry, always plays the dominant role and priority must be given to the rational development of heavy industry. At the same time, agriculture and light industry are the base of heavy industrial development. Accelerating the development of agriculture and light industry is part of socialist industrialization, it is not something which lies outside socialist industrialization.

As pointed out by Le Duan in his report, in the immediate future, giving priority to the rational development of heavy industry is first of all designed to develop the dominant role played by heavy industry, support and stimulate the performance of the primary and pressing tasks of the 1976-1980 Five Year Plan of developing agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, the artisan and handicraft industry, and consumer goods production.

Clearly realizing the position and role of agriculture, the great advantages and capabilities of agriculture throughout our country, and the extremely pressing and important requirements facing agriculture in the advance by our country's socialist economy, this is a line and political viewpoint of fundamental significance, a viewpoint which each of us must fully maintain.

We must admit that, from the point of view of the everyday activities of many party organizations, many state agencies, and many cadres in responsible positions, we have failed over the past several years to truly understand the extremely important position of agriculture.

We have yet to determine what each sector, echelon, and unit should do or what the best method of operation is for each sector, echelon, and unit in order to help stimulate the development of agriculture nor have we created a combined strength for moving agriculture forward within a correct relationship between industry and agriculture.

In our planning and plans, we have made mistakes in establishing the relationship between industry, primarily heavy industry, and agriculture, in the distribution of investment capital to agriculture and the heavy industrial installations and sectors supporting agriculture, in the use of this investment capital, and in orienting the activities of the various sectors which support and stimulate agriculture.

Today, practically of the sectors, from the machine sector, electric power sector, coal sector and chemicals sector to the construction sector, the building materials sector, the communications-transportation sector, and so forth are still confused, they are not supporting agriculture well, and some sectors have even failed to establish very clear plans and measures for supporting agriculture. A few typical examples can be cited. For decades, we have been stating the need to fully equip farmers with hand tools but we still have not done so, and full use is not being made of machine capacity. Increased mechanization has been carried out in a vague, patchwork, and unplanned manner; the effort made has not been small but the results achieved have not been commensurate with this effort. In water conservancy, the improvement of farmland water conservancy systems was raised as a requirement late, it was carried out poorly for many years, and it was not until very recently that progress was made in this area.

In the field of circulation and distribution, we are still making many mistakes in organizing the economic relations between industry and agriculture, between the cooperative and the state in numerous matters pertaining to purchasing, pricing, material supply, credit, and other policies; therefore, although the state has made more than a small effort, the returns from which have not been appropriate, we have still caused problems for farmers and failed to develop the role played by these policies in stimulating the strong development of agricultural production.

In agricultural production, from such major matters as planning and zoning areas of specialized farming and intensive cultivation to such specific matters as researching and establishing suitable technical measures for each type crop and species of livestock, we have been slow to act and have failed to meet requirements. Particularly with regard to grain, a strategic material of key significance, we have failed to promptly adopt the necessary policies and measures; therefore, production has improved very slowly and is still unstable. Many of the important relationships within agriculture, such as the relationship between farming and livestock production, the relationship between intensive cultivation to increase crop yields and expanding the amount of area under cultivation, and so forth are not understood well nor have they been established well.

We have also been slow to realize the close relationship between agriculture and forestry and failed to develop mutual assistance between these two economic sectors. For a long time, we restricted the scope of operation of the cooperatives in the mountains to a very limited portion of agriculture (rice and a few subsidiary food crops) and placed all forestry activities outside the scope of these cooperatives; therefore, it has been very difficult to consolidate the socialist collective economy and difficult to develop production. The state forestry agencies have wanted to tightly manage forests and forest land but they do not have the capability to harvest or maintain all forests and this had led to the serious destruction of forests, which has had many grave consequences for many years.

The party and government decided long ago to assign forest land to cooperatives for business purposes; however, the agencies in charge have delayed carrying out this decision.

All of the shortcomings mentioned above must be actively rectified.

It is necessary to fully understand //the relationship between the central economy and the local economy// and fully implement the policy of "simultaneously carrying out central economic construction and local economic development."

This policy is designed to make full use of each of the country's capabilities; developing the creativity of the locality under the centralized, unified leadership of the central level; causing large-scale socialist production to develop within all areas and levels of the national economy; meeting the varied needs of localities; creating the conditions for closely linking production to circulation, distribution, and consumption; and creating favorable conditions for coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation.

Beginning in 1965, during the first war of destruction waged by the U.S. imperialists against northern Vietnam, we made every effort to develop the local economy and made the provincial level government an economic management echelon. As a result, the local economy underwent a strong stage of development, thereby actively contributing to the performance of economic and rear service tasks in the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation. On the other hand, several rather serious shortcomings were evident in the development of the local economy and the division of economic management echelons, shortcomings which were primarily due to the failure to fully understand this policy.

These shortcomings resulting from a lack of understanding and knowledge coupled with the maladies of departmentalism, partialism, and localism had a number of bad consequences. However, as a result of these consequences, a number of cadres in responsible positions hesitated and took a second look at the policy and the principle underlying it; instead of boldly supporting and helping the local economy develop in the right direction and to an appropriate degree, they wanted to put all installations directly under the central level which would have been totally incorrect.

Recently, together with the importance of the local economy, we have gradually realized the importance of the technical sectors of the economy and we have placed emphasis upon the sector. This is very correct. However, we should not, as a result of our emphasis upon the sector, understand the sector incorrectly and place the economy of the sector in opposition with the local economy. In the immediate future as well as over the long range, the development of the local economy under the close leadership of the central level will always be of strategic importance.

Since the day southern Vietnam was totally liberated, we have been carrying out the policy of dissolving the zone echelon and merging provinces; each province of our country now has a population of roughly 1 million to more than 2.5 million and is a territory of important strategic significance; thus, we more clearly see the importance of the local economy.

When talking about the local economy, we should primarily understand the local economy to be that part of the national economy put under the direct management of the provincial level government. At the same time, we have, during recent years, gradually realized the very important position and role of that part of the national economy which is under the direct management of the district level.

It must be emphasized here that we absolutely must not divide and assign work in a mechanical manner: the government and the various ministries cannot only concern themselves with the central economy, considering it the economy "of the central level"; the provinces, on the other hand, cannot only concern themselves with the local economy, considering it the economy "of the locality." This error in thought and action has had bad consequences in northern Vietnam and, in the past year, has caused damage in southern Vietnam by giving rise to acts of partialism, departmentalism, and localism; concerned parties have turned their backs on each other or competed for each "profitable" production installation or products, thereby damaging the economy, hampering the work of the various sectors and echelons, and causing a lack of unity among cadres.

With regard to this matter, we cannot divide the policy of the party into two parts: one dealing with the "construction of the central economy" carried out by the ministries and one part dealing with the "development of the local economy" carried out by the various provinces; if this were done, there would be no party line or policy. Every ministry, province, and districts, every cadre and party member in every position, all of us must thoroughly and scrupulously implement the party's policy on "simultaneously carrying out central economic construction and local economic development and coordinating the central economy with the local economy."

To accomplish this, we must fully adhere to the principle of coordinating management by sector with management by territory, which is an important principle of the system of socialist economic management.

The minister is a member of the Council of Ministers and, at the same time, the head of one or a few sectors throughout the country. The minister manages

one or a few sectors in accordance with the principle of coordinating management by sector and management by territory. Within the sector, there are elements of the central economy and the local economy, elements of the state-operated economy and collective economy, and there can even be a number of private capitalist enterprises within a certain scope and for a certain amount of time, that is, until the socialist reform of them has been completed. Within the central economic element in the sector, there are installations under the jurisdiction of the ministry which manages the sector and installations under the jurisdiction of other ministries. The minister, on behalf of the council of Ministers, must provide highly efficient and effective state management of the elements of the central and local economies within his sector. If the ministry only concerns itself with the elements of the central economy or only pays attention to a number of units under the ministry it will only fulfill part of its task, duty, and responsibility and, as a result, it will be unable to avoid confusion in its operations and unnecessary conflicts will develop with the various local governmental echelons and the other ministries.

The provincial people's committee is both an element of the unified socialist state and an agency elected by the provincial People's Council on behalf of the local people which is responsible to the people of the province. The provincial people's committee manages all the work of the state within the territory of the province. Its economic responsibilities include managing the construction and development of that portion of the economy put under the direct management of the provincial level by the government (called the local economy) and fulfilling its task, duty, and responsibility to the installations under the central level located within the province and to the entire economy within the territory of the province. The provincial people's committee provides management within the province on the basis of the principle of coordinating management by sector and management by territory. The economy of the province consists of elements of the central economy and the local economy. If the provincial people's committee only gives its attention to the local economy, it will only fulfill part of its task, duty, and responsibility and thus be unable to avoid confusion in its operation and unnecessary conflicts will develop with the various ministries and the other localities.

We have basic state documents which define the tasks, duties, and responsibilities of the ministries and provincial people's committees in economic management. To implement these documents well, we must adopt numerous regulations governing each management activity; we must, as soon as possible, correct those aspects of the division of labor among a number of ministries and the division of echelons between the ministries and a number of localities, in northern as well as southern Vietnam, which are unreasonable or are the subject of disputes.

It is necessary to fully understand and properly implement the policy of coordinating the economy with the defense of the nation.

At present, the primary aspect of this policy is making every effort to use the very large, tightly organized, highly disciplined, and highly politically

enlightened forces of the armed forces to actively and competently participate in economic construction and development. We must successfully utilize the great economic capabilities of the hundreds of thousands of young men who are now in the army or will join the army to fulfill both their military and labor obligations at the same time. Of importance here is the need to guide and help the armed forces comply with the economic laws, the laws and regulations of the state concerning the economy, and the principles and guidelines of socialist economic management in their economic activities in order to achieve high productivity, high quality, and high efficiency and develop the exemplary-vanguard role of the people's army.

As regards the equipment, machinery, vehicles and technical materials now being managed by the army, it is necessary to fully comply with the provision set forth in the resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum: "All the manpower and wealth of the entire country and all the material bases, equipment, and machines previously used to support the revolutionary way must now be used to support both the economy and the defense of the nation and be used in part to support economic construction and development." All actions which are contrary to this provision and reflect partialism and departmentalism are harmful to the general revolutionary undertaking.

In the new stage, we must make every effort to consolidate the national defense system and build increasingly powerful national defense forces. To accomplish this, we must have a stable and strong economy capable of supplying our national defense forces with all the necessary means, means for which we had to rely upon aid from the fraternal countries during the war. Therefore, rapidly creating the economic strength of the fatherland also means creating the base for strengthening the national defense system. At the same time, in the planning and zoning of economic areas, in the establishment of economic development plans, in the development of areas of the country of strategic economic and national defense significance, in the redistribution and reorganization of the social labor force, and in specific economic activities we must always give our attention to closely coordinating economic requirements with national defense requirements and build the best possible forces and establish the most effective strategic positions possible in order to defend the fatherland and be ready to thwart each plan of aggression of imperialism and maintain the territorial integrity of the country.

It is necessary to fully understand the viewpoint concerning the relationship between accumulation and consumption.

We must clearly realize that the need to accumulate capital for socialist industrialization and the need to improve the standard of living of the working people are basic and pressing needs, needs which are second in importance to no other needs. We must also realize that certain aspects of these two needs are in conflict, sharp conflict in some cases, while other aspects are in harmony, not only in terms of prospects many years hence, but in terms of the immediate future as well.

In the present stage, the need to accumulate capital and consumer needs are very large at a time when national income earned from production is not high

enough to meet these needs. Solving the consumption problem involves improving the standard of living of the people, beginning with reducing the difficulties they are encountering in their everyday lives and giving priority to the producers of material wealth because the labor force is our largest and most basic source of accumulated capital. This is a fundamental issue because the objective of socialism is to give the people a decent, happy life; this is also an urgent and immediate issue because, at present, if we do not endeavor to improve the standard of living of the working people we will not have the conditions required to reproduce labor for socialist industrialization. This means that we must make correct use of the consumption fund (social consumption and personal consumption), fully comply with the principle of distribution in accordance with labor, with efforts directed first toward production workers in jobs which are strenuous or endanger their health, and take determined steps to eradicate the ills of misappropriation, officialdom, and favoritism within the sectors responsible for carrying out distribution and supporting the lives of the people.

As regards accumulation, it is necessary to correctly distribute the accumulation fund; specifically, it is necessary to distribute investment capital and use it in a very correct manner which yields high returns in order to meet the need to strengthen the material and technical base and meet the needs of the people's standard of living.

Capital must first be accumulated from within the national economy, from the national income produced within the country. The only way to acquire a large volume of capital to satisfy the needs of accumulation and consumption is to develop the national economy on the basis of an efficient economic structure and make every effort to develop production by making full use of the social labor force, the natural resources of the country, and the existing material-technical base, equipment, and tools.

With regard to the sources of capital for accumulation as well as the supply of consumer goods, we once again see the role played by agriculture, by grain and food products, by forestry and fishing. For a number of years to come, these will continue to be the foremost sources of capital, sources which will enable much capital to be rapidly accumulated. On the other hand, of the needs of everyday life, the foremost and most basic need is the need for food, a need which only agriculture, fishing, and forestry can meet.

Therefore, the correct viewpoint concerning the relationship between accumulation and consumption is inseparable from the correct viewpoint concerning the relationship between industry and agriculture and the role and effect of the socialist system of agriculture.

Accumulation basically means constantly raising labor productivity and constantly raising product quality and economic returns in order to have many surplus products after meeting the consumer needs of society. At the same time, it is necessary to implement a policy of strict economization, considering it a major policy of the party and state. However, practicing economy does not mean reducing the scale of production or ignoring basic requirements in

an attempt to mechanically and conservatively reduce our expenses. Practicing economy does not imply that we can use the shortage of labor and materials and the need to avoid waste as a pretext for failing to carry out all planned tasks and being lax and not looking for every way to develop potentials.

Actively practicing economy means making the best possible use of the labor force and each production capability, tightly managing and making full use of the work time of all of society and of each collective and individual, endeavoring to meet advanced standards and quotas in production and business, and reducing production costs through measures designed to improve management and apply technical advances. In the final analysis, the most important kind of economization is economizing on work time. Marx considered this the first law of every society carrying out expanded reproduction. In this field, we are still being very wasteful in the distribution, organization, and use of the more than 20 million persons in the social labor force, in utilizing the work time of an enterprise, cooperative, and agency, and in the intensity of work and the labor productivity of a person during the "8 golden hours."

We must fully understand the viewpoint concerning building an independent, autonomous economy and the viewpoint concerning the relationship between self-reliance and expanding our economic relations with foreign countries.

As stated above, we must quickly and clearly realize the change in international cooperation and, on this basis, more strongly emphasize our policy of being self-reliant, developing each capacity and potential of the country, and making every effort to produce a large volume of export goods; we must quickly create the monetary forces needed in import-export relations and be determined to end the purchase of luxuries which far exceed domestic supply capabilities.

The habit of extravagant consumption is totally contrary to the socialist way of life. If this mistaken habit continues, we will be unable to develop production in order to meet our needs and will surely encounter more and more economic difficulties which, in turn, will give rise to many other negative social and moral phenomena. In life, consumption based on continued reliance upon foreign countries gradually leads to economic dependence and the inability to maintain and strengthen the independence and autonomy of the country in order to move forward.

The viewpoint of being self-reliant demands a strong and clear change in thought and action, in understanding the political and economic lines of the party, in the ability to organize and manage, and in the effort to eradicate the bad habits which have become deeply rooted in production and construction as well as in the everyday lives of each family and individual.

The report by Le Duan to the recent session of the National Assembly clearly presented the foreign relations task of our state and people in the new stage and the basic thinking behind our foreign policy.

In keeping with this task and basic thinking, we must try to utilize the past and present achievements of the scientific-technological revolution in the world to accelerate the reconstruction of our country.

Displaying the spirit of self-reliance and the spirit of independence and autonomy is in no way contrary to making every effort to enhance our country's international position and influence and expand our cooperative relations with the fraternal and other countries.

We must know how to seize the opportunity, utilize the great political prestige of our country at this time, and promptly develop upon the favorable conditions which are creating the possibility for developing the relations between our country and many other countries in order to make the highest possible use of economic assistance, cooperation, and trade for the purpose of meeting the pressing, immediate needs of our country and quickly creating the key material-technical bases, create our own strength for moving forward.

Only on the basis of displaying self-reliance, strengthening our material forces, and improving our ability to organize and manage is it possible to take full advantage of the favorable economic conditions resulting from the great victory of the war of resistance against the United States and make the best possible use of the results of international cooperation and rapidly transform what we receive from other countries into our own assets, from complete equipment sets, raw materials, and finished materials to advanced knowledge of and experience in organization and management as well as science and technology.

The viewpoint concerning the source of strength for completing each task in the new stage of the revolution:

We must develop //the combined strength of the entire system of organizations of the dictatorship of the proletariat,// that is, the leadership of the party, the management function of the state, and the role played by the mass organizations in mobilization and organization, so that we can, in the end, develop the system of collective ownership of the working people and develop the inexhaustible strength of the people.

The experiences gained in northern Vietnam as well as those gained in southern Vietnam during the past year prove that the results of each activity are largest and most stable when the combined strength of the entire system of the dictatorship of the proletariat is employed. The general election in April was a brilliant example of this. Conversely, if only part of the system's strength is employed, we will either achieve no results or only partial, temporary results. In a few cases in which there was a lack of coordination among the elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat system, these elements hampered one another and encountered difficulty in their work.

In the new stage of the revolution, the requirements of each element have greatly increased and the need to smoothly coordinate them in order to develop the combined strength of the entire system of the dictatorship of the proletariat has also greatly increased.

The leadership of the party, the management of the state, and the activities of the trade union, the Youth Group, the Women's Federation, and the United National Front must change to be consistent with the new situation and task.

The main guideline and role of this change is to implement, as fully as possible, the system of collective ownership of the working people and launch a revolutionary movement of the working masses to engage in production, practice economy, and carry out socialist reform and socialist construction in order to truly make the socialist revolution the undertaking of the masses throughout the country.

Lenin pointed out: "Among the people, we are like a drop of water in the ocean and, only when the aspirations of the people are correctly expressed, can we manage the state. Otherwise, the communist party will be unable to lead the proletariat, the proletariat will be unable to persuade the masses to follow it, and the entire machine will break down."(4)

In his opening speech at the 3rd Party Congress, President Ho also emphasized: "The revolution is the undertaking of the masses, it is not the undertaking of heroic individuals. The success of our party lies in the fact that it has organized and developed the inexhaustible revolutionary forces of the people and led the people in struggling under the banner of inevitable victory of Marxism-Leninism."(5)

We must insure that the people are the persons who are led and managed, that their democratic rights are expanded by state agencies, that they are consulted and can participate in discussions, that they are allowed to enjoy all their rights while fulfilling their obligations, etc. All this is necessary but it is not enough. The people must be the only and absolute masters of the country and the state, and the dynamic and creative authors of the socialist system in our country.

This is a fundamental viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism, an extremely important viewpoint in the line of our party in the new stage of the revolution. This viewpoint must be thoroughly implemented in the revolutionary line and policy of our party as well as in each management activity of the state, in the management plan and policy, in the organization and operational procedures of the management apparatus, and in the daily thoughts and actions of each cadre. Bureaucracy with all its strange forms is the complete opposite of this point of view, as opposite as water and fire.

The shift of the revolution to a new stage demands that each cadre and party member thoroughly understand the viewpoints presented above and fully understand and apply the latest developments in the line of the party reflected in the specific tasks for the next several years pointed out by the report of Le Duan to the recent National Assembly session.

Each of our cadres and party members, especially those in key positions of responsibility in central agencies and on the provincial level, must equip himself with the strategic point of view of the party so that each of his actions assumes a political significance, not only an administrative significance. By equipping himself with the strategic point of view of the party, he can make a competent contribution through jobs of a tactical nature to the gradual creation of the new strategic position of the socialist national economy and our entire social system.

We must criticize all incorrect viewpoints, thoughts, and actions which are inconsistent with the viewpoint and line of the party. We must also criticize superficial, shallow, and administrative ways of thinking and acting which reflect the failure to see political guidelines and understand viewpoints because these failures easily lead to deviations and mistakes.

III. Improving the Ability To Organize and Manage, Beginning With the Ability To Organize and Manage the Economy

The basic requirement which most clearly reflects the nature of the shift to the new stage is: //improving our ability to organize and manage, beginning with our ability to organize and manage the economy.//

Lenin had some things to say about this requirement that were to the point and illuminating. He pointed out: "The second task (that is, the organizational and management task--N.D.T.) is more difficult than the first task (that is, the task of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and smashing their resistance--N.D.T.) because it cannot be carried out by means of a single heroic action; this task requires a display of the highest spirit of bravery, perseverance, tenacity, and endurance in an action of a mass and //everyday// nature. However, this task is also more important than the first task because, in the final analysis, the deepest source of energy for winning victories over the bourgeoisie and the only guarantee of the permanence and the irreversible nature of these victories can only be a new and higher mode of production and the replacement of capitalist and petty bourgeois production by the system of large-scale socialist production."(6)

Concerning the new ability and the new mode required by the shift of the revolution to the new stage, Lenin emphasized that in the face of the organizational and management task, we should not, under any circumstances, act in a "charge bravely forward" fashion, we should not, under any circumstances, "beat the drum" to build enthusiasm. He who does this cannot avoid total bankruptcy as a politician, as a socialist. And, Lenin appealed to communists and the working class to make every effort to learn the art of management.

In our country, President Ho pointed out: "In the development of the country, //economic and financial management// is extremely important. If we do not provide tight management, we will be unaware of our shortages and surpluses, and all our efforts will be stymied."(7) He also said: "To build socialism, we must increase production and practice economy. To increase production and practice economy, we must provide good management."(8)

In his report to the recent session of the National Assembly, Le Duan also confirmed: "Because economic activities and economic management are of primary importance and are relatively new and difficult, we must give particular attention to //improving the ability of the state in the area of economic activities and economic management//."(9) He set forth three targets, three requirements of economic management: high productivity, high quality, and high efficiency.

Thus, we clearly see the close relationship and reciprocal effect between the line and organization and management. The line sheds light on organization and management; organization and management insure the implementation of the line and, at the same time, test it in practice, thereby helping supplement and develop the line. We say that our party is the leader and organizer of each victory of the revolution. This means that providing leadership through a line and organizing the implementation of this line are closely linked in the historic mission of the party. Each party member must express the correct viewpoints and lines in his ability to organize and manage, in specific actions in the field of organization and management that yield practical results.

In the new stage of the revolution, one of the major problems we face is: our party must know how to lead and our state must know how to organize and manage the productive labor of the more than 20 million working people throughout our country as creatively, intelligently, and skillfully as they led and organized the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation.

The shift to the new stage demands that we improve our ability to organize and manage the state, manage the various aspects of social life, the central aspect of which is organizing and managing the economy.

Briefly stated, economic management is:

1. Thoroughly understanding the line of the party, properly applying the various economic laws, and establishing, by means of a correct planning method, plans to serve as the primary tool, the center of economic management;
2. Establishing management policies and regulations suited to the requirements of the plan, insuring the implementation of the cost accounting system, and properly utilizing the various economic levers;
3. Establishing a streamlined and effective management apparatus and training and organizing the corps of cadres within this apparatus;
4. Supervising implementation, that is, managing the apparatus, coordinating the various sectors and echelons, managing cadres, and organizing and mobilizing the masses to complete the state plan well, correctly implement the cost accounting system and all policies and regulations, and make correct use of the various levers;
5. Inspecting implementation in order to develop upon strongpoints, rectify shortcomings, and gain experience.

The task concerning organization and management in the new stage has been very clearly defined: we must rapidly unify the management of the entire country while improving management and moving forward to establish a new system of management and planning of the entire country in order to advance the economy to large-scale socialist production and advance the entire country to socialism.

To fulfill this large and important task, the general spirit behind the effort to improve our organizational and management ability is:

--Developing the combined strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat in organization and management and implementing the system of collective ownership of the working people in organization and management;

--Applying the economic laws of socialism and giving appropriate attention to applying the law of value in the planning and management of the national economy;

--Maintaining and strengthening the fundamental organizational and management principles of revolutionary activities, of the socialist state, and of the socialist economy while raising our scientific level and becoming the masters of and properly utilizing the modern methods and tools of organization and management; this will closely link the revolution and science in organization and management;

--Criticizing and correcting each thought and act which violates economic laws and violates the fundamental principles of revolutionary activities and of the socialist state while criticizing and correcting all thoughts and actions that are anti-scientific, obsolete, backward, or outmoded.

When we enter the new stage, the central task of which is organization and management, we will have a certain amount of knowledge and experience in organizing and managing the economy, knowledge and experience gained by a party which has been in political power for 30 years and has been carrying out socialist construction in one-half of the country for 20 years.

//We must correctly evaluate these realities and experiences.//

Our evaluation of the organization and management of the economy in northern Vietnam can be summarized as follows:

Economic management made a positive contribution to the great victories of the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation and the great achievements of the socialist revolution.

In the war and in the management of the war time economy, our state and our management apparatus proved to be effective.

In the construction of the new economy in northern Vietnam, we have gained initial experiences in the management of the national economy as well as the management of sectors and the management of enterprises and cooperatives. We have gradually established correct viewpoints, guidelines, and policies for improving economic management. We have also gradually trained, under actual conditions, a corps of relatively knowledgeable and experienced economic management cadres.

In both its nature and principle, the present economic management system in northern Vietnam //is becoming// a socialist management system.

An effort has always been made to comply with and express the line of the party in the management of the economy. //The planning principle// of the national economy, which was enacted in 1955 and maintained throughout the violent war, was an important factor in the achievements of economic management. During recent years, years of peace, //the principle of cost accounting// was established and a number of foundations of cost accounting have begun to be established. As regards the organization and operation of the management apparatus, //the principle of democratic centralism// has always been considered the basic principle. From the very outset, //the motive behind economic activities// has been to develop the patriotism and love of socialism of the people while giving attention to material incentives and upholding the legitimate rights of the worker.

In summary, looking back over the past few decades and using the fulfillment of revolutionary tasks as the basis for evaluation, we can state that we have recorded //important achievements in economic management.// The viewpoints and thinking concerning the improvement of economic management in northern Vietnam are basically correct and, if we carefully review them we can learn lessons and draw conclusions in the nature of principles for use in the construction of the new system of socialist economic management throughout the country.

We know that economic management is a science and an art, it is a new and difficult problem. In view of the fact that our country recently experienced a long and violent war and is advancing directly to socialism without experiencing the stage of capitalist development, this problem is even newer and more difficult. The economic laws of socialism are not yet having the full effect they should have upon our economy. During the war, the capabilities of the party and nation had to be devoted to the fight against the enemy. Under such circumstances, it can be even more clearly seen that the achievements we have recorded in economic management are important ones, the experiences we have gained are valuable.

However, there are still many weaknesses and deficiencies in economic management. They are:

1. The mode of management is the administrative-supply style of management which disregards and sweeps across echelons and is restrictive and rigid. It gives light attention to calculations and the effort to achieve increasingly high productivity, quality, and returns.

(Note: the administrative-supply malady referred to here is administrative bureaucracy which impedes production and supply procedures which disregard echelons, do not involve the calculation of returns, and do not correctly coordinate administrative measures with economic measures; it is, as Lenin said, totally necessary to understand and properly apply administrative methods: "Here, it is absolutely necessary to solve problems through the use of administrative orders and on the basis of the administrative point of view.")

2. The organization of production is decentralized, divided, fragmentary, unsynchronized, and seriously imbalanced. It does not comply with the principles

of organization of large-scale socialist production; it lacks vertical-horizontal and top-bottom coordination. Finally, it has not penetrated to the installation and has not developed existing production capabilities well.

3. The management apparatus is bureaucratic, cumbersome, and inefficient. In the organization and operation of this apparatus, the principle of democratic centralism and the principle of coordinating management by sector with management by territory are neither correctly understood nor correctly applied.

The above situation has the following //objective causes//:

--//The remnants of the old system//: the old system left behind an economy which had a very poor material and technical base, a decentralized and very imbalanced organization of production patterned after small-scale production, and many fundamental weaknesses in terms of the distribution of social labor and the distribution of productive forces. The old system also left behind the habits of small-scale production and serious aftereffects in the form of the ways of thinking and acting and the low academic, scientific, technical, and management levels of cadres and the working people.

--//The consequences of the long and violent war//: the war destroyed the economic base, partially disrupted the organization of production, and created very large difficulties in economic management; on the other hand, it forced us to rely too heavily upon administrative management measures to maintain war time supply operations. Upon the conclusion of the war, we faced many large economic, social, and management problems, problems which developed during the war and cannot be easily solved in 1 or 2 years.

However, //the primary causes are our shortcomings// in economic management. Generally speaking, we do not have a full understanding of nor have we correctly applied the various economic laws, the principles of management, and the principles of organization which are part of our socialist economic management system and dictatorship of the proletariat state; our implementation of the above has been both bureaucratic and loose.

The three weaknesses and shortcomings in economic management have affected one another. The decentralized, fragmented organization of production has caused the management apparatus and management activities to become decentralized and fragmented. The mode of management which does not distinguish between echelons has caused the management apparatus to become increasingly complex, cumbersome, bureaucratic, and remote from the masses. The lack of discipline and responsibility in the management apparatus has lessened the good effect of and worsened the weaknesses in the organization of production and the mode of management.

These shortcomings and weaknesses have caused our economic management system not only to fail to develop, but they have also limited the strong forces created by the socialist system. (The largest force is the system of collective ownership of the people under the leadership of the working class, represented by our party; this force also unifies the interests of society with the

interests of each collective and each worker). Therefore, the efficiency and effectiveness of economic management are low. This prolonged low effectiveness and efficiency has created a serious state of stagnation because conservative thinking as well as the maladies of rightism and "saving face" are rather prevalent.

Over the past several years, we have been carrying out a program to improve economic management in accordance with the resolutions of the Party Central Committee. However, economic management has yet to undergo the strong qualitative change we desire and the revolution demands. This is because the improvement of economic management has been carried out in a haphazard and incomplete manner; this elements of the program have not been coordinated, measures are not interconnected, mobilization forces have not been coordinated, and planning and the other measures of economic management have not been closely linked; the supervision of activities have lacked determination and not involved guidance, inspections, or the review of experiences; decisions and activities have frequently been half-hearted due to the failure to thoroughly research and discuss them, etc.

In evaluating the economic management situation in northern Vietnam, it is necessary to oppose two erroneous tendencies:

The first is the tendency to be subjective, impatient, and irritated over the continuing shortcomings and weaknesses; this leads to the failure to recognize objective circumstances and conditions and correctly evaluate the achievements in economic management; it also leads to unjustified complaints and criticism and sometimes to denying the leadership results of the party, the management results of the socialist state, and the results of the sacrifices and efforts made by the cadres and working people of northern Vietnam.

The second is the tendency to be subjective and conservative, to lack the spirit of criticism and self-criticism, to lack a sense of responsibility to the party and the masses, and to use objective circumstances and conditions as well as the achievements which have been recorded to conceal or minimize subjective weaknesses and shortcomings, particularly the shortcoming of allowing negative phenomena and sluggishness to persist and even become more serious.

Our evaluation of the economic management structure and methods left by the U.S.-Thieu system in southern Vietnam is summarized as follows:

Throughout the entire economy of southern Vietnam, it was an economic structure which was dominated by neo-colonialism, within the orb of capitalism, and controlled by the bureaucratic, monopolistic compradore bourgeoisie. This mode of economic management had profits as its objective and was based on the market structure; therefore, it cannot be used and must be replaced by the new mode and organization of economic management of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We have some experience in rapidly and effectively organizing the relationships between production-construction and circulation-consumption; we have some experience in rapidly and effectively organizing the relationship

between the cities and the countryside. However, these experiences cannot be mechanically applied, rather, we must modify them to be consistent with the principles and nature of the new management system.

In the economic-technical sectors, the organizations of production and business in the past took the form of capitalist corporations. These corporations, although they represented a step in the advance from small-scale production to large-scale capitalist production, were often composite, mixed corporations encompassing many different sectors and trades but not because of a high level of socialization of production, nor were they production federations resulting from the development of science and technology. These business organizations did not adhere to any clear principles with regard to the sector or territory in which they operated; their disorderly arrangement was closely linked to the war, the nature of neo-colonialism, and the nature of the economy, closely linked to the business influence, power, and interests of the individual capitalist or group of capitalists.

Within the enterprise, the supply of technical materials and the consumption of products were links between the enterprise and the market; instead of being functions of the enterprise, they were controlled by the general economic structure. Under the old system, supply and consumption were generally rapid because the structure of the capitalist market and the impact of neo-colonialism made the economy and each enterprise in southern Vietnam dependent upon the foreign imperialist economy.

As regards production within the enterprise, the mode of management and the management rules, regulations, and procedures left behind by the old system can generally be divided into three categories:

1. //Reactionary practices which must be immediately eliminated// and the elimination of these practices must be publicly announced so that workers understand why this has been done;
2. //Practices which must be changed and reformed// before they can be applied; these practices must be promptly changed and must not be applied in their original form nor conveniently eliminated;
3. //Practices which can be applied in their original form// because they are positive factors. These practices are some of the strongpoints of the previous method of enterprise management in the organization of production and production lines, the work skills and discipline of the worker, bookkeeping and accounting procedures, and the streamlined organization of the management apparatus (however, they also have many drawbacks, such as the absence of a //planning department// and the //very weak organization of technical management// which generally involved reliance upon foreign specialists).

It must be recognized that the previous economic management structure in southern Vietnam had some good points but they were capitalist good points. We can only learn and properly apply them if we clearly recognize their capitalist nature. Lenin emphasized that the communist must learn from the

management experience of capitalism and the Taylor system of management; but, Lenin himself, before mentioning the good points of the Taylor system, exposed its capitalist nature as a system which very barbarously and cruelly exploits the worker.

In evaluating the economic management situation in southern Vietnam prior to liberation, we must oppose two erroneous tendencies:

The first is the failure to clearly recognize the reactionary and backward nature of the previous management system while simply and superficially noting the pace of business, the large profits, and the high labor productivity in a number of enterprises and economic activities and, as a result of this superficial viewpoint, exaggerating the strong and good points of the old management system and even considering them a model or standard for success.

The second is the lack of the spirit of truly trying to learn and, on the basis of exposing the capitalist nature of the old system of management, rejecting every aspect of it, concluding that it is necessary to immediately abolish the old system of management, and, as a result, hastily dismantling the old economic apparatus in a sweeping move that is not researched at a time when we have no new management system to replace it.

--In unifying the management of the entire country, improving economic management, and building a new system of management and planning, the //basic guideline// set forth within the resolution passed by the 20th Party Plenum is: "Abolishing the administrative-supply style of management, implementing management based on the socialist mode of business, overcoming the unsophisticated, decentralized organization of management of small-scale production, and establishing the organization of management of large-scale industry in order to accelerate the advance of the national economy from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production."

The resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum also pointed out:

With regard to northern Vietnam:

"We must make every effort to improve economic management and social management and put the management of the state on a regular basis. We must take determined steps to abolish the administrative-supply style of management, implement economic management based on the socialist mode of business..."

With regard to southern Vietnam:

"In an economy which is in the process of transition to socialism and consists of many economic segments, the mode of economic management must be based on developing the dominant and guiding role played by the state-operated economy and the state plan with attention to the flexible application of the commodity and monetary relations, the coordinated application of the levers of credit, prices, wages, bonuses, profits, and so forth in order to stimulate increased labor productivity, reduced production costs, higher product quality,

and the production of an increasingly wide variety of goods to meet the varied needs of the people..."

On the basis of the basic guidelines mentioned above, the areas in which we must strengthen and improve economic management are:

--As regards //the organization of production,// we must eliminate the decentralized, divided, uncoordinated, and imbalanced organization of production and build the structure of the new organization of production of large-scale socialist production throughout the country, within each sector, within each locality, within each territory, and in each basic unit.

--As regards //the mode of management,// we must eliminate the practice of encompassing many echelons (including supply procedures that were truly necessary during the war but are no longer suitable; the shortcomings of encompassing many echelons were not correct even during the war and must be rectified); we must implement the socialist mode of management, use the state plan as the center of management, truly implement the system of cost accounting, and correctly utilize the various economic levers.

--As regards //the management apparatus,// we must rid ourselves of the maladies of bureaucracy and officialdom and correct the lack of discipline and lack of responsibility; we must build the management apparatus and work regulations of large-scale socialist production and uphold the right of collective ownership of the working people.

The activities involved in improving economic management generally fall into two categories: unifying the management of the entire country and improving management throughout the country. These two categories are closely related. Because, we must soon reunify even the management of the entire country which is a larger and much more complex job, a job for which we have many more advantages in our favor and many more capabilities; therefore, it is even more important that we improve management. On the other hand, the more we successfully improve management, the more we will help ourselves unify the management of the entire country better. We must unify the country in order to acquire additional material forces and experience for improving management. And, we must improve management in order to more rapidly reunify the management of the entire country and achieve better results from this aspect of reunification.

In keeping with the basic guidelines mentioned above and to meet the primary requirements mentioned above, we must improve planning, implement cost accounting, utilize the various economic levers, reorganize production, reorganize the management apparatus, improve work regulations, etc.

Here, we cannot discuss all of these matters but only emphasize a number of points which must be given attention in the immediate future:

1. //Improving planning and establishing a good 1977 plan and a good 1976-1980 Five Year Plan.//

This is a matter of decisive significance because the state plan is "the second platform of the party," the primary management tool, and the center of the management system.

The state plan must truly be the second political platform of the party, the basic economic law of the state, and the aspiration and will of the masses which vividly reflects the political line and economic line of the party. In the years to come, the state plan must more thoroughly implement the policy of socialist industrialization with suitable components and in suitable stages to insure the full use of the country's production capacity and raw materials, the planning of the organization of the socialist system of production and the development of the economy, the close coordination of economic development and the consolidation of the national defense system, and the gradual advance to large-scale socialist production.

We must do a better job of applying the system of economic laws with appropriate attention to the law of value, intensify the application of the commodity-monetary relations and market relations in planning, and, on this basis, unify the quantitative plan and value plan and closely link the plan with cost accounting, with policies, regulations, and levers so that the plan is a source of strong inspiration and motivation for the worker.

We must correctly implement the principle of democratic centralism, control the primary aspects and elements and the basic balances of the economy from the central level, and, at the same time, increase the independence of the basic units, sectors, and localities and closely coordinate planning by sector with planning by territory.

We must broaden the practice of democracy and tap the intelligence of the collective so that the plans of the state are truly products of the vast knowledge and experience of the corps of economic and scientific-technical cadres and the working people.

In the immediate future, we must successfully implement in the targets, tasks, balances, and norms of the plan for 1977 (and the 5-year plan) the program of the party for accelerating agricultural production, forestry, and fishing and the production of consumer goods and exports, carrying out one stage in the redistribution of labor, utilizing the social labor force well, and orienting heavy industry toward developing the dominant role it plays in accelerating the performance of these tasks which have been established for the immediate future while building heavy industrial enterprises of a key nature. This is also the course and the way to quickly make full use of the entire country's abundant social labor force, rapidly reduce and eventually eliminate unemployment and semi-unemployment, gradually redistribute the social labor force in an efficient manner, and so forth so that everyone who can work has a job and works with high productivity. This is a pressing requirement of the state plan and a basic requirement of the new strategic deployment of the national economy and the reorganization of social production for many years to come.

In keeping with the above mentioned policy of the party, we must quickly and deeply research planning methods, beginning with successfully improving agricultural planning and capital construction planning; at the same time, we must improve the planning of the development of forestry, the planning of the development of fishing, and the planning of the consumer goods, artisan, and handicraft industries. These are fields of planning in which we are particularly weak.

An extremely important aspect of planning, one which strongly controls each economic activity, is: in view of the fact that we are still greatly dependent upon foreign countries for many types of essential finished materials and practically all equipment systems and the fact that our agricultural production is still greatly dependent upon natural conditions, of what does correct, positive, and strong planning consist? If we ignore these realities, our research into the improvement of planning methods will be misdirected. In the establishment and implementation of plans, we must always remember and comply with the spirit of the words stressed by President Ho: "Norms are worth 10, measures are worth 20, and determination is worth 30." Very much attention must be given to establishing plans on reliable bases and in accordance with carefully calculated economic-technical guidelines. Very much attention must be given to laying the material foundations needed to insure that the norms which have been established are met and surpassed. Our plan must be a positive and well balanced plan, it must be a source of confidence to workers so that the various sectors, echelons, and installations realize, as soon as the plan is announced, that it can be met and that it can be exceeded if they work well. On the other hand, plans cannot be balanced in a negative manner by sitting idly by in the face of difficulties and not seeing or making every effort to develop each existing capability and potential. As with every other activity, planning must be both revolutionary and scientific in nature. In planning, we must possess the spirit of carrying out a revolution, of trying to move forward; we must not charge forward without making the necessary preparations nor should we be conservative and hesitant.

We must establish plans and the basic balances on a nationwide scale; there must be appropriate plans for the installations and localities in southern Vietnam. These are new problems with regard to the methods of planning, problems which must be solved better in the establishment of the 1977 state plan.

Planning must be closely linked with the other measures of economic management, even in the process of establishing plans, especially with the economic levers in order to make correct use of the commodity-monetary relations. On the other hand, we must fully calculate the returns from the improvement of economic management, considering it a source of forces for establishing targets and tasks, establishing the various balances, and determining planned norms. Thus, planning and economic management must be closely coordinated from the time plans are being established in order to create the conditions for closely coordinating them when plans are being implemented.

2. Applying the commodity-monetary relations, implementing the system of cost accounting, and utilizing the various economic levers in a close and unified relationship with the state plan.

In the construction and management of the socialist economy, we must properly apply the economic laws of socialism and make the plan the center of our efforts. However, during the entire period of the transition to communism and during the present stage in our country, we absolutely must know how to use the law of value in the overall relationship among the various economic laws in which the economic laws of socialism occupy the dominant position; know how to use the various value categories and the commodity-monetary relations; know how to apply the law of distribution in accordance with labor and the principle of material incentive. Giving the law of value equal importance with the economic laws of socialism (or more importance than them) and giving the market (the free market) more importance than the plan of the state while overemphasizing the principle of material incentive are mistakes of opportunism. Conversely, giving light attention to, disregarding, and wanting to eliminate the law of value, the various value categories, the commodity-monetary relations, and so forth are "leftist" mistakes which cause the national economic management system to become bureaucratic, sluggish, and ineffective.

Many of our current management policies and regulations are still much in the nature of the administrative-supply war time style of management and pose major obstacles to the effort to accelerate socialist construction.

Therefore, the general spirit behind the improvement of management policies and regulations is: developing the role played by the management policies and regulations as levers in a manner coordinated with the state plan and by correctly applying the economic laws and establishing the correct relationships among the various interests in economic activities. Management policies and regulations must combat the practice of encompassing many echelons in production and business and the display of "officialdom" toward the masses; they must establish the system of self-assumed responsibility of the enterprise with attention to providing incentive for the enterprise to make innovations, improve its techniques, and heighten its economic returns and to providing incentive for the worker to raise his productivity and improve the quality of products; they must promptly and appropriately reward (both spiritually and materially) enterprises and persons who do good work and promptly and strictly penalize (both spiritually and materially) enterprises and persons who do bad work.

Management regulations and policies must be expressed as state laws. This is a very important and urgent need. The state cannot go for 1 day without laws. The basic law is the Constitution, and the 1959 Constitution will remain in effect until the new Constitution is drafted. However, how many laws and regulations are there for managing the economy and managing the various aspects of life?

Laws and regulations must be unified throughout the country. Naturally, there can be a number of separate regulations for a number of localities but, basically speaking, laws and regulations must be unified throughout the country.

While unifying management laws and regulations throughout the country, we must improve these laws and regulations. This is a very complex job, one which demands that we assess the situation and possess management knowledge and knowledge of the law; at the same time, it is a job which involves a very large amount of work. For this reason, we cannot gather and research each and every policy and regulation as this would be a job that would drag on without ever being completed.

Rather, we must select and concentrate on a number of key policies and regulations:

--In southern Vietnam, they include the policies and regulations designed to insure the implementation of the resolutions of the party concerning abolishing the compradore bourgeoisie and partially reforming private capitalist businesses, especially in commerce; abolishing the feudal land-owner cropland relations and establishing good cropland relations among farmers; preparing for the socialist reform of agriculture, the handicraft and artisan industry, and small businessmen; reforming and accelerating ideological activities, cultural activities, the streamlining of organizations, etc.

--In northern Vietnam, they include the policies and regulations designed to insure the implementation of resolutions 19-CP and 61-CP as well as the resolutions concerning the artisan and handicraft industry with efforts concentrated on a number of established key points: materials and prices; wages and bonuses; the division of financial echelons; enterprise statutes; the manager system; the district level and the township level; the policy providing incentive to clear land for the establishment of new economic areas; specific measures for assigning land and forests to cooperatives for business purposes, etc.

--In the basic units of the socialist economy, they include the policies and regulations designed to insure the true implementation of the system of cost accounting. It must be recognized that the system of cost accounting is a tightly structured system; if one element or part of this system is not coordinated with the rest of the system or comes to a halt an obstacle will immediately be posed to the entire system. Therefore, implementing cost accounting requires that each basic unit make a very great effort; at the same time, the various upper echelons must make every effort to create the conditions and premises for cost accounting and closely supervise and thoroughly inspect the implementation of cost accounting. The jobs which must be performed include: reorganizing the production of each sector and each enterprise; improving enterprise planning so that the plan itself requires cost accounting; issuing and implementing a number of management policies and regulations which are closely linked to cost accounting (concerning prices, wages, profits, credit, and economic contracts); improving the system of economic-technical standards and norms; reorganizing the economic information system; issuing and implementing enterprise statutes in order to appropriately increase the production-business independence of the enterprise and establish the enterprise's status as an individual under the law; and fully implementing the enterprise manager system.

--On a nationwide scale, they include the policies and regulations designed to insure the unification of the management of the entire country and the rearrangement of the economic relations, production relations, material supply relations, product consumption relations, commodity and currency circulation relations, and so forth at an early date. Particularly important at this time are a number of policies and regulations designed to make full use of existing production capacity, find substitute domestic materials, practice thorough economy in production, construction, and consumption, etc.

3. //Reorganizing production, improving the management apparatus, and revising work procedures.//

It is necessary to express a correct relationship, not one which mechanically separates them nor one which joins them in a confused manner, between the production organization and the management organization, between economic-administrative management and production-business management.

The management apparatus must be constructed in accordance with the requirements of the production organization in order to support and stimulate production; it cannot be divorced from the production organization as a result of which it grows and becomes increasingly cumbersome and creates many intermediary echelons which retard production and create difficulties for production.

In this spirit, it is necessary to reorganize the production of each enterprise, sector, and area. In the process of advancing the economy to large-scale socialist production, it is necessary to organize forms of production federations (corporations, federations of enterprises, or federated enterprises) which have an efficient scale and a clearly defined task and which carry out production and business in economic-technical sectors and are managed by economic-technical sectors on the basis of fully preparing the necessary conditions and premises. This work must be done on a case by case basis, it cannot be carried out within any general framework.

On the basis of reorganizing production, we must streamline the administrative apparatus and take determined steps to eliminate unnecessary administrative agencies and reduce the non-productive work force.

As regards the organization of management, we must establish, the sooner the better, the four state governmental echelons set forth in the resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum.

It is necessary to heighten the responsibility of the Council of Ministers and the responsibilities of the ministers. The ministers must be given full and appropriate authority in every area (especially the authority of utilizing materials, labor, and capital within the framework of the state plan and in accordance with state law) so that they can fulfill both their collective responsibility (as members of the Council of Ministers) and their personal responsibility (for the sector or field assigned to them). In conjunction with this, we must strengthen the comprehensive management function of the provincial level state government within the territory of the province.

Generally speaking, it is necessary to fully comply with the decisions concerning the statutes of organization and operation of the Council of Ministers and the tasks, authority, and responsibilities of the various ministries, the provincial level government, and the municipalities directly under the central level with attention to applying these decisions in a manner consistent with the present actual situation of the country. At the same time, we must accelerate our research efforts so that we can soon issue decisions concerning the tasks, authority, and responsibilities of the district and township levels.

In the immediate future, we must urgently revise a number of inefficient aspects of the division of labor among the various ministries and resolve the problems and disputes involved in the specific division of echelons between several ministries and a number of provinces and municipalities directly under the central level.

As regards work procedures, it must be clearly realized that they are an extremely important factor in creating the effectiveness of the management apparatus.

On the one hand, and this is of primary importance, we must always maintain and strengthen the elementary but very fundamental operational principles and procedures of the socialist state, such as the following: conducting an investigation, conducting research, and making good preparations before deciding upon a matter; once a meeting has been held, there must be determination, once determination has been built, there must be action and all actions must be inspected; collective leadership, specific persons in charge, and clearly defined individual responsibilities; strict discipline and obedience of the upper echelon by the lower echelon; accurate, honest reports; self-criticism and criticism; rewarding good work and taking disciplinary action in cases involving poor quality work. The most pressing need at this time is the need to uphold //the individual responsibility system, the manager system, and state discipline.// Lenin emphasized the harm caused by bureaucracy, irresponsibility, and the lack of discipline and demanded that a determined and decisive struggle be waged against bureaucracy within the state apparatus. He also resolutely struggled for the manager system, considering it a matter pertaining to the class stand, a principle in the organization and management of the socialist state. Lenin demanded the rapid shift from the "collective management" system, a system which only had reasons to exist during the first years of the soviet government and during the civil war and which was considered transitional in nature, to the system of "one manager," the only correct system in the management of the dictatorship of the proletariat state and the construction of a system of large-scale socialist industry. The manager system does not, of course, conflict with or eliminate the collective system and the collective method of working nor does it conflict with or eliminate the need to tap the intelligence of the collective of the corps of cadres and the masses; rather, it must be coordinated with the above and be placed under the leadership of the party committee echelons. The strength and effectiveness of the management apparatus lies in these elementary but basic principles.

On the other hand, in view of the large-scale and complex nature of economic management in the new stage of the revolution, we must rapidly reach the level of modern science and quickly become the masters of the methods and tools of science used in work procedures. We must know how to scientifically organize investigation and research and establish many different economic-technical plans. We must know how to scientifically organize the system for collecting and processing information, the process of preparing for and making decisions, the process of organizing implementation and inspecting it, etc.

To insure that the organizational and management activities mentioned above are carried out well, we must return to a basic matter regarding the management of the state, that is, //the system of collective ownership of the people.// The state fulfills the function of managing society but this state is a state of, for, and by the people, it is the state which most clearly expresses the right of collective ownership of the people under the leadership of the party. Therefore, in its management of the national economy as well as every other aspect of social life, the socialist state must reflect this basic principle and combat the greatest danger to a party in political power, namely, bureaucracy.

A correct management system is one which insures respect for and the upholding of the right of collective ownership of the people in every respect. Only such a system truly stimulates and develops, as highly as possible, the great creativity of the people.

//The socialist system of law// is the legal system of the state system mentioned above, a legal system which protects and guarantees the right of collective ownership of the people against hostile classes and enemies that would violate this right. This is true with respect to the Constitution and all of our laws. Without the socialist system of law, it is impossible to talk about the socialist state, about the right of collective ownership of the people. The system of law, as Lenin said, must be unified: "There can only be one system of law, and the greatest danger to us, as well as a manifestation of our cultural inferiority, is our tolerating the antiquated viewpoint of Russia and the semi-barbarous habits of wanting to maintain a system of law in Kaluga Province that differs from the system of law in Kazan Province." (10) We must resolutely struggle against violations of the system of law in every field of social life, against acts which violate the democratic rights of the citizen in the fields of economics, culture, and social life and in their everyday lives; we must insure that the citizen can live and work in tranquility and safety without being threatened by any social injustice. We must insure that each citizen is able to fulfill all his obligations and enjoy all his democratic rights as well as the other rights granted him under the law. We must insure that no citizen is intimidated, unjustly accused, or treated in an unjust manner which does not comply with the law; conversely, we must not allow anyone, regardless of his position, to commit a crime without being prosecuted under the law.

Violations by state agencies and cadres, the armed forces, the organizations of the party, and the mass organizations of state laws and the right of

collective ownership of the people, especially in the field of the material and spiritual rights of the people and their democratic freedoms, including the freedom of the body, have caused legitimate indignation on the part of the people, tarnished the prestige of the state, and, as a result, reduced the effectiveness of state management.

Here, we should pause to recall the teaching of Uncle Ho: "Be not afraid of shortages, only be afraid of injustice; be not afraid of poverty, only be afraid of the people becoming dissatisfied."

Our socialist system of law must develop gradually and eventually become a comprehensive system of law encompassing all social activities. In the present stage, our country is expanding its relations in many areas with many other countries and attention must be given to establishing and fully implementing the laws and regulations of the state concerning international relations, fully complying with the foreign policy line of the party, and respecting the international laws and customs observed by the countries of the world. It is necessary to establish close, smooth coordination among related state agencies to insure the correct implementation of the laws and regulations of the state and international relations.

Finally, the matter of decisive significance in organization and management is //cadres.// A good system of organization and management has the effect of training and improving cadres. However, only with a good corps of cadres and good cadres is it possible to establish and implement this good system of organization and management.

In all the activities designed to unify and improve economic management throughout the country, each sector, echelon, and cadre must make an effort to resolve every matter with a strategic point of view closely linked to the viewpoints concerning the line of the party and must become skilled in science and management and change their mode and methods of working.

The correct strategic point of view and specific, accurate professional activities are, in the final analysis, designed to successfully implement the system of collective ownership of the working people, launch a movement of the masses, of the tens of millions of workers, to engage in productive labor and practice economy, rapidly complete the reunification of the country in every respect, and rapidly, steadily, and strongly advance the entire country to socialism.

IV. Improving the Abilities and Qualities of Cadres and Party Members

The entire significance and substance of the shift of the revolution to a new stage must be reflected in the party's corps of cadres. The lines and policies of the party and the plans and policies of the state are transformed into mass movements through the activities of the corps of cadres. Therefore, "cadres determine everything," cadres are the nucleus of all revolutionary activities at this time. The resolution passed by the 23rd Party Plenum stated: "It is necessary, on the basis of the revolutionary situation of the

party and the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat state, to build a corps of party and state cadres who, in terms of their class nature, are members of the working class, are absolutely loyal to the party, the fatherland, and socialism, have the ability to carry out the political tasks of the party, and have the ability to maintain the role and strengthen the leadership of the party and develop the strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat state."

The completion of the reunification of the country and the advance of the entire country to socialism face the corps of cadres with very high requirements; at the same time, they create very favorable conditions for developing and improving the corps of cadres, in general, and for the personal training and cultivation of each cadre, in particular.

Based on the general cadre standards set forth in Political Bureau resolution 225, the abilities of the cadre in the new stage consist of two intrinsically linked categories:

--The ability to conduct activities (which includes the ability to understand and apply the viewpoints and lines of the party);

--Revolutionary qualities.

Above everything else, the cadre and party member must, on the basis of being absolutely faithful to the party, class, and nation and completely agreeing with and thoroughly understanding the system of party viewpoints and lines, be a determined fighter who protects and implements these lines, who sees things on the basis of these lines, who thinks on the basis of these lines, and whose every action originates in these lines.

In the present stage of the revolution, the cadre and party member must have the ability to organize and manage, must have scientific, management, academic, and technical knowledge, and must have the ability to organize implementation. Each cadre and party member must arm himself with the ability to establish and supervise the implementation of plans and establish and supervise the implementation of management policies and regulations; each cadre and party member must have the ability to carry out increasingly large and complex activities and the ability to manage the work and the relationship among the collectives of manual workers, management cadres, and scientific-technical cadres. Finally, and this is of very basic importance, each cadre and party member must be able to mobilize the masses, he must be skilled in transforming the lines and policies of the party and state into a mass revolutionary movement. In summary, he must have the ability to organize and manage and practical skills which keep pace with the requirements of the shift of the revolution to a new stage.

In the present stage of the revolution, the cadre and party member must possess high revolutionary qualities, these qualities are absolute loyalty to the party, the revolutionary-offensive spirit, the spirit of responsibility, and the determination to struggle to complete each task of the party. They also

include the mass character, that is, the quality of being the truly loyal servant of the people, of wholeheartedly serving the people and, as a result, having the confidence of the people and being deserving of being their leader. They also include the sense of organization and discipline, the spirit of self-criticism and criticism, and the attitude of respecting and fully implementing each line and policy of the party and each resolution, law, rule, and regulation of the dictatorship of the proletariat state.

The abilities and qualities of the cadre are closely interrelated. On the basis of correct viewpoints, the ability to organize and manage is created and revolutionary qualities are improved. On the basis of forging one's ability to organize and manage, one gains a more thorough understanding of viewpoints and expresses his revolutionary qualities in good results from his work. On the basis of cultivating revolutionary qualities, one lays the basis of his abilities and equips himself with a basic factor so that he can agree with the viewpoints and lines of the party, not only with his reason, but with his soul and deepest feelings as well.

The qualities and abilities of the cadre must be examined in his performance of the task assigned him by the party and must be evaluated on the basis of the results of the implementation of the party's political task. Naturally, this does not mean that we should examine these qualities and abilities in a form for form's sake manner, only look at individual jobs, or only use a temporary result as a basis for evaluation. Rather, we must analyze the objective circumstances and subjective effort of the cadre throughout the entire process of carrying out a task, we must examine his qualities and abilities through many different jobs, jobs performed not only under easy, favorable circumstances, but especially jobs performed during times of difficulties and complications.

Examining the cadre through the performance of his work does not mean ignoring matters pertaining to his personal life and character. The cadre must lead a wholesome, pure, and simple life, this is an important requirement of revolutionary qualities and virtues. However, in addition, we must also evaluate the political and ideological qualities of the cadre through the viewpoint and stand he takes with regard to matters pertaining to the lines of the party, through his spirit of responsibility, his sense of organization and discipline, his determination to overcome difficulties, his ability to organize and manage, and his ability to complete each task of the party.

We must reject every tendency to separate qualities from abilities, to view qualities and abilities as two separate, opposite categories; to understand qualities and abilities in a onesided manner, that is, to only consider one's class background, job record, character, and personal life when examining his qualities or only consider his diploma when examining his abilities. We must denounce even more harshly the practice of using and promoting cadres in a manner which is not based on standards, not based on the requirements of the task but only based on personal feelings of fondness or animosity, on personal relations, on local relations, or on factionalism within the party.

We must establish specific standards for each type cadre in each different sector and echelon to serve as the basis for the selection and deployment of cadres and for further accelerating the training of cadres.

We must particularly emphasize the selection and deployment of the corps of leadership cadres and management cadres, particularly the core cadres in charge of the various sectors, localities, and installations. They are a force which occupies a very important position in the establishment and maintenance of the political line of the party, in organizing the successful implementation of this line, and, as a result, in strengthening the leadership role of the party and developing the management effectiveness of the state.

As the resolution passed by the 23rd Party Plenum pointed out, to build a corps of cadres "we must do a good job of selecting, training, distributing, promoting, and utilizing cadres, adhere to the cadre standards and policies of the party..."

The shift of the revolution to a new stage during the past year has provided an opportunity for strongly developing the basic strength and, at the same time, it has been a challenge which has clearly revealed the weaknesses of the corps of cadres, in general, and each cadre, in particular.

Briefly stated, these weaknesses are:

With regard to their understanding of lines, a number of cadres still have a vague idea of the basic content of the revolutionary line of the party in the new stage and the very difficult and complex nature of the present class struggle; this has led to loopholes and problems in many fields; to overestimating the enemy or relaxing one's vigilance or not being vigilant at all against the enemy; to underestimating the enemy and lacking confidence in and not boldly mobilizing the masses; to incorrectly evaluating the activities of the party and state by placing heavy emphasis upon shortcomings and weaknesses without concern for building and developing the position of socialism in every respect. With regard to the viewpoints concerning lines, a rather serious weakness which has caused the most harm is the failure to fully understand the viewpoint concerning the economic line of the party and the viewpoints concerning organization and cadres.

With respect to abilities, many cadres lack the necessary academic, scientific, technical, and professional knowledge, lack knowledge of management and the organization of implementation, and even lack knowledge of theory, lack practical ability and a proper work style.

As regards revolutionary qualities, a number of cadres have displayed a weakening of their will to fight and a few have even made serious mistakes in the areas of the revolutionary-offensive spirit, their loyalty, their sense of organization and discipline, their respect for the right of collective ownership of the people, and their personal lives. During normal times, these shortcomings are not good; in the cities (of northern as well as southern Vietnam) they have had serious consequences of a political nature. If not promptly rectified they will lead to degeneration and deterioration.

Poorly developed abilities and shortcomings in the area of revolutionary qualities are closely related to and affect each other. Misunderstanding of the viewpoints concerning the lines of the party have restricted the development and cultivation of organizational and management ability while creating loopholes for these shortcomings to worsen and cause harm. The poorly developed abilities of the cadre have narrowed his thought and vision and posed difficulties to gaining a thorough understanding of the viewpoints concerning the lines of the party, thereby causing the cadre to often fail to discern between right and wrong while resulting in mistakes in the area of revolutionary qualities. And, once revolutionary qualities have begun to deteriorate, a serious shortcoming has been committed, one which easily causes a misunderstanding of the viewpoints concerning the lines of the party, even if they were correctly understood prior to this time, one which makes it difficult to develop one's abilities, regardless of how good they used to be, one which can even cause abilities to develop in the wrong direction.

In the spirit of responsibility of the communist to the party and the people, we must forthrightly expose the weaknesses and shortcomings that still exist in our corps of cadres. We must pursue this effort with even greater boldness primarily because the basic attributes of our corps of cadres are strongpoints, the potential of our corps is great, and the prospect for progress by the entire corps as well as each cadre is very bright.

Generally speaking, our comrades in southern Vietnam have, during the past year, quickly adjusted to the shift to the new stage; they have undertaken new and complex jobs involving an unprecedented volume of work and work schedules of unprecedented urgency. For example, this is the first time we have taken over the management and directed the affairs of a city of 3.5 million people such as Ho Chi Minh City; naturally, we have encountered some confusion and problems but we have, for the most part, been successful. In the shift from the war of resistance to social and economic management, many cadres have displayed talent and ability and they have rapidly learned and properly applied the viewpoints concerning the lines of the party; they have been able to work with the various strata of the people and have made many innovations as well as rapid progress.

During the past several years, our comrades in northern Vietnam have made gradual progress with regard to their understanding of the line of the socialist revolution, their ability to manage the socialist economy, and their ability to conduct research as well as their ability to organize implementation. Some are rather highly experienced in managing basic units, managing a sector, or managing a locality. Some have gradually coordinated political ability, management knowledge, and necessary scientific, technical, and professional knowledge.

Today, all of us must make an effort to improve our abilities in every respect. We should recall the advice given by Lenin: "Learn, learn some more, never stop learning." At this time, being determined to learn and overcoming every difficulty faced in order to learn are a manifestation of the communist party spirit, of revolutionary qualities. Each comrade must, while performing

the task assigned him, review his abilities and, on the basis of his strengths and weaknesses, formulate a learning plan, a plan to learn theory and practice, learn in schools, learn on the job, and learn from the masses.

Each cadre must make every effort to reflect the shift of the revolution to the new stage in his abilities and qualities, make every effort to develop upon his strengths and rectify his shortcomings. The party organization must always concern itself with helping cadres and party members make progress. The party will harshly deal with those persons who intentionally pursue a mistaken course, who reject the education of the party.

With regard to the spearhead of the struggle against the most serious and damaging shortcomings, the report by Le Duan to the recent session of the National Assembly pointed out: "We must determinedly combat laziness, the habit of avoiding work, the theft of public property, bribery, misappropriation and waste. We must harshly denounce and wage a determined struggle against such phenomena as irresponsibility, arrogance, officialdom, the creation of bothersome and unnecessary procedures and paper work, indifference and even hardheartedness in the face of the difficulties and suffering of the people, the habit of accepting criticism in an insincere manner,... These phenomena violate the right of ownership of the people and sometimes even harm the political life of the citizen. We must also take effective measures to prevent a number of cadres and personnel of state agencies from becoming a stratum of persons who have special rights and privileges and 'ride herd' on the people."

The malady of bureaucracy, as Lenin stated, is the greatest danger to a party in political power. If we do not alertly guard against and promptly correct each manifestation of bureaucracy, it will slowly spread and not only be a shortcoming in the thoughts and actions of a number of cadres, but it will even penetrate the management policies and regulations and the rules and procedures of the state, penetrate the structure and style of the state apparatus, and can even infiltrate the organization of the party and the mass organizations.

Bureaucracy originates in a mistaken point of view, in the failure to view the revolution as the undertaking of the masses, in the failure to clearly realize that the nature of socialism requires the implementation of the system of collective ownership of the people under the leadership of the party. Bureaucracy also develops from the mistaken concept of wanting to be in a high position, a concept which is a bad influence from the class of exploiters. Bureaucracy is another cause of the lack of knowledge and ability which ties a person to his desk and imprisons him in the meeting room or causes him to busy himself with administrative work all day without being in touch with the people or reality.

Regardless of its source, every manifestation of bureaucracy must be resolutely criticized and rectified. In the activities of the party and state, it is necessary to heighten the spirit of loyalty, support positive attitudes and actions, combat opportunism, lying, false reports, the fault of

seeing what is right but not protecting it, the fault of seeing something wrong but not struggling against it, the habit of pleasing the upper echelon, the practice of trying to win over or suppress the lower echelon, and the attitude of seeking revenge against persons who are struggling forthrightly.

In the internal life of the party, we must heighten the sense of protecting the solidarity of the party, comradeship, and the spirit of criticism and self-criticism while combating factionalism, localism, jealousy of another's position, saving face, and struggling in a manner not based on principle.

The shortcomings and mistakes mentioned above have one origin, namely, individualism. Chiefly because of individualism, some of our comrades have "shifted to the new stage" by going backwards, by going in a negative direction, by deviating from the line of the party, and by concealing their inherent ability and lowering, even destroying, their revolutionary qualities, thereby more than slightly tarnishing the prestige of the party, state, and army in the eyes of the people. President Ho advised us: "The victory of socialism is inseparable from the victory of the struggle to eradicate individualism." To accomplish this we must wage a serious struggle on the ideological, criticism, and self-criticism front. At the cadre conference held last year to disseminate the resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum, Truong Chinh said: "In our ideological activities, we must //build// and //combat//; we cannot build certain things if we do not combat others, conversely, if we combat certain things without building others, our ideological activities will lack targets. Generally speaking, building is more important." We must build the revolutionary thinking of the working class; we must combat the thinking of the petty bourgeoisie and the influences of bourgeois ideology and abolish the remnants of feudal ideology and all other non-proletarian ideologies.

Raising viewpoints, abilities, and revolutionary qualities to the level of the new stage is a process of difficult struggle, of coordinating the change within each cadre and party member with the change in the organizational and cadre activities of the various party committee echelons. We must patiently struggle and make gradual, steady progress; and, marked progress must be made through the current political education and self-criticism and criticism campaign.

Conclusion

The revolutionary undertaking of our people has shifted to a new stage and this shift must be a complete and thorough one. The working people of the entire country made this shift very quickly, effectively, and decisively.

By means of their countless sacrifices in the long and arduous revolutionary struggle and by means of the impressive feats of arms and victories that have been recorded, the working people of our country have shown themselves to be very worthy of enjoying the beautiful fruits of independence and freedom, of the reunification of the fatherland, and of socialism.

We communists, who struggle and make sacrifices throughout our lives, have but one goal, eliminating the suffering of the people and bringing them happiness.

President Ho once spoke the simple but very moving words: each Vietnamese, each Vietnamese family knows suffering. The totality of this suffering is my suffering.

President Ho said of his feelings, feelings which are shared by we communists: throughout my life, I have had but one desire, one overriding desire, that our country be independent and that all of our compatriots are well fed, well clothed, and educated.

In his testament, Uncle Ho thoughtfully reminded us: //the working people// in the lowlands as well as the mountains have endured hardships for generations, they have been suppressed and exploited by the feudal and colonialist system, and they have experienced many years of war.

However, our people are very heroic, brave, enthusiastic, and diligent, Since the day it was established, our people have followed the party and been very faithful to it.

The party must have a very good //plan// for developing the economy and the culture in order to constantly //raise the standard of living of the people."//(11)

Today, aggressor armies have been swept from our country, the fatherland is reunified, and our compatriots have been joined together under the roof of one house. We must continue to move forward, fully carry out the testament of Uncle Ho, successfully build socialism in our country, and bring prosperity to the fatherland and happiness to our people.

To establish and implement very good economic and cultural plans, we must have the correct viewpoint concerning lines, have the ability to organize and manage well, and possess good revolutionary qualities and virtues. Rapidly developing these attributes is the task, the responsibility, the noble and weighty honor of each of our communist party members.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap," [Selected Works], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1960, p 705.
2. Ho Chi Minh: "Vi doc lap, tu do, vi chu nghia xa hoi," [For Independence, Freedom, and Socialism], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 229.
3. Le Duan: "Toan dan doan ket xay dung To quoc Viet-nam thong nhat xa hoi chu nghia," [All of the People Are Uniting To Build the Reunified Socialist Vietnamese Fatherland], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 13.
4. V. Lenin: "Complete Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, Volume 3, p 354.

5. Ho Chi Minh: "Tuyen tap,"...p 803.
6. V. Lenin: "Selected Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1959, Book 2, Part 2, p 209.
7. Ho Chi Minh: "Ve phat trien san xuat, thuc hanh tiet kiem," [Developing Production and Practicing Economy], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1973, p 145.
8. Ho Chi Minh: "Ve cach mang xa hoi chu nghia va xay dung chu nghia xa hoi," [The Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1976, p 33.
9. Le Duan: "Toan dan doan ket,...," p 35.
10. V. Lenin: "On the Socialist System of Law," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 381.
11. Ho Chi Minh: "Vi doc lap...." pp 329-330.

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LOCAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Hanoi HOC TAP in Vietnamese No 9, Sept 76 pp 50-58

[Article by Lieutenant General Le Quang Hoa]

[Text] Local military activities are a very important part of the buildup of the army and the consolidation of the national defense system by our party and state. They have always been the base of the people's war and the buildup of the people's armed forces.

Today, while carrying out the central task of building socialism throughout the country, our army and people must heighten their vigilance and conduct better local military activities. Because, they are the base, the foundation upon which our army and people build a strong national defense system.

Formation and Stages of Development

More than one-half century ago, while the ruling yoke of the French colonialist aggressors weighed heavily on the necks of our people, President Ho was the first Vietnamese to discover the truth: "There is no other course for saving the country and liberating the nation than the course of the proletarian revolution." (1) President Ho clearly explained his revolutionary thinking in "Duong kach menh" [The Revolutionary Road]. In order for the revolution to win victory it was first of all necessary to have a revolutionary party. "As the smooth operation of a boat requires a strong helmsman, so, too, the success of the revolution requires a strong party." (2) At the same time, it is necessary to have forces. President Ho said: "The revolution is the job of all the people." "Workers and farmers are the origin of the revolution" (3); we must "work among the masses, awaken them, organize them, unite them, train them, and lead them in the struggle for freedom and independence." (4) The revolutionary thinking of President Ho and the party is the basis, the foundation of the military thinking of our party, in general, and the first forms of local military activities, in particular.

The political platform and action program of the party during the years 1930 and 1931 stated: "To fulfill the task of the party in the revolution, it is first of all necessary to organize independent mass organizations (the

Association of Workers, the Association of Peasants, and so forth)" and, at the same time, "organize worker and peasant self-defense units to protect laborers during strikes, meetings, demonstrations, marches..." On the basis of establishing self-defense units, it was necessary to establish guerrilla units to wage "the guerrilla war and armed uprisings." And, the resolution passed by the 1st Congress of the Indochinese Communist Party (March 1935) stated that after winning political power it is necessary to establish "the red army of the worker-farmer soviet state" and, at the same time, "always maintain the revolutionary nature of the self-defense unit" and "maintain the party's tight command of the standing self-defense force." On the basis of the experience gained in the Bac Son, Do Luong, and Nam Ky uprisings and the intense revolutionary movement of the masses with its two forms of revolutionary struggle, the political struggle and the armed struggle in a number of localities, the 8th Party Plenum, under the chairmanship of President Ho, observed: "We can, with the forces we now have, lead an uprising somewhere within each locality and win victories which will open the way for a large-scale general uprising." (5) In keeping with the resolution of the Party Central Committee and a directive from President Ho, a revolutionary base area began to be built in Cao Bang. And, on 22 December 1944, as a result of a directive issued by President Ho, the Vietnam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation was established. Together with the national salvation army, it was the first main force unit of the Vietnamese people's army. One very important matter is that, in this directive, President Ho pointed out: "Because ours is a national resistance being waged by all the people, we must mobilize and arm all the people. Therefore, when concentrating our forces to establish the first unit, we must maintain the local armed forces and have them coordinate their operations and assist each other in every respect. The main force unit has the task of guiding the cadres of the local armed units, assisting them in training, and supplying them with weapons if possible, thereby helping these units to constantly grow." (6)

Obviously, the local military has its own origin. The period of time extending from the establishment of the party to the victory of the August Revolution was the period during which our party led all of our people in the struggle to win political power throughout the country. Following the revolutionary course charted by the party, our people waged an increasingly intense political struggle and armed struggle, staged small uprisings and waged limited guerrilla wars where possible, won political power in one locality at a time, and eventually staged a general uprising to win political power throughout the country when a major opportunity arose. In these struggles, the self-defense units, guerrilla units, and guerrilla base areas were formed and developed, spreading from a number of localities to everywhere in the country. When conditions existed for establishing the first main force army, President Ho and our party clearly defined the task and position of the main force army and the task and position of the local army together with the organic relationship between them on the basis of mobilizing and arming all the people.

When the August Revolution achieved success, the revolutionary government was still young. The fatherland had only recently won its independence. After

enjoying the rights of freedom and democracy under the new system for only a short period of time, our people had to continuously struggle against the Japanese army followed by the Chiang Kai-shek and British armies and then wage a 9 year war of resistance against the French colonialists. The military line of our party during this period developed from the thinking of mobilizing and arming all the people and staging an armed uprising to win political power into the thinking of waging a long war of resistance against the old style colonialist war of aggression of France, an old colonialist, imperialist power. This was the thinking of launching a strong, full-scale people's war everywhere using the armed forces of the people, comprised of the three military elements, as the nucleus of the people's fight against the enemy. Closely linked to this thinking, the military activities in the various localities were focused on the primary jobs of:

--Making every effort to build the resistance war spirit of all the people in keeping with the appeal by President Ho: "Men and women, old and young, regardless of their religion, political party, or nationality, all the Vietnamese must stand up to fight the French colonialists to save the fatherland. Those who have rifles must use their rifles; those who have swords must use their swords; those who have no swords must use spades, hoes, or sticks. Everyone must endeavor to oppose the colonialists and save his country."(7)

--Building and consolidating the militia, self-defense, and guerrilla forces: this was a very important job and an outstanding success in all localities during the resistance against the French. President Ho pointed out: "The militia, self-defense, and guerrilla forces are the forces of the entire nation, they are an invincible force, an iron wall of the fatherland. regardless of how powerful they might be, every enemy will be routed when they encounter this force, this wall."(8) With regard to organization, President Ho instructed: "We must effectively organize and train a guerrilla militia for each village. The guerrilla militia must be used as the foundation."(9) In addition to waging guerrilla warfare to defend the locality, protect the people engaged in production, and fight the enemy, the guerrilla militia and self-defense forces were also a source of manpower for the main force army.

--Building resistance war villages: every resistance war village was a combat fortress of all the people, a place where troops from all three military elements were stationed to provide defense and attack the enemy. Many strong resistance war villages were merged to form the base areas of localities. As a result, the construction of resistance war villages not only encompassed the military operations of the armed forces, but also encompassed the numerous forms of mass struggle in the fields of politics, economics, enemy proselyting, resisting enemy forces occupying and pillaging villages, etc. The acceleration of military activities and armed operations created more favorable conditions for the development of other activities and operations. The leadership nucleus of the resistance war village was the party chapter. Only with strong and determined party chapters could there be outstanding resistance war villages.

In every strategic area of the fatherland there were also strategic rear bases for each area and the entire country. At these places, the jobs of establishing and consolidating the political base and the armed base, establishing the new style of life, increasing production, practicing economy, achieving self-sufficiency, and so forth were set forth by a system of organizations, governments, and mass organizations from the central to the various local levels which organized the performance of these jobs through specific, clear policies and systems. The process of building and consolidating the strategic rear bases contributed many important experiences for improving the defense plans of large localities and forming the national defense system throughout the country later on. During this period, the military activities in the localities involved many jobs. Of foremost importance was the job of building up the guerrilla militia and self-defense forces at each installation and within each locality and using these forces as the nucleus in the launching of a movement of all the people to fight the enemy and as the reserve forces of the constantly growing main force army. A system of military organizations--from the provincial military unit to the township military units--was established to specialize in helping the local party committee echelon and government guide the movement of all of the people fighting the enemy, guide and command the buildup and combat operations of the local armed forces.

The war of resistance against French aggression ended in victory. Northern Vietnam was totally liberated but southern Vietnam was still ruled by imperialism and its lackeys. The U.S. imperialists had jumped into southern Vietnam, kicked out the French, and transformed southern Vietnam into a neo-colony and military base of the U.S. under a plan of preparing to attack northern Vietnam, resisting the socialist camp, and blocking the offensive of the revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia.

In the face of this situation, intensifying the buildup of the army and the consolidation of the national defense system was considered a primary task of the entire party, all the people, and the entire army. The national defense task during this period was protecting northern Vietnam as it advanced to socialism while struggling to liberate southern Vietnam and fulfill our international obligation. During the years that followed, because the U.S. imperialists constantly intensified their war of aggression against our country, our party led all of the people in rising to resist the United States for national salvation. Southern Vietnam was the great frontline and northern Vietnam was the great rear area of the entire country.

Through the years when northern Vietnam was building up its armed forces and consolidating its national defense system in peace and, in particular, through the realities of the resistance against the United States for national salvation on a nationwide scale, local military activities underwent new stages of development. In March 1957, the resolution passed by the 12th (enlarged) Party Plenum pointed out: "The thinking that everything will be easy now that peace has been restored, that the danger of war no longer exists now that the forces of world peace are strong, and that the imperialist enemy, having suffered a painful defeat in northern Vietnam, will not dare

commit acts of aggression anymore are both erroneous and dangerous. We must make every effort to correct these lines of thinking, to teach our cadres and party members, teach our people and army to always be highly vigilant against the plots of the enemy, always maintain and strengthen their will to fight, and make every effort to strengthen the defense forces of the country. We must actively build up the army and consolidate the national defense system; this is one of the main tasks of our entire party and all our people at this time. Our guideline for building up the army is actively building a powerful people's army and gradually advancing it to conventionalization and modernization. We must carry out the conventionalization and modernization of the army on the basis of heightened revolutionary awareness. We must insure that our army not only has strong standing forces, but also has a strong reserve force; to achieve this, we must implement the military draft system to replace the present system of volunteering for military service... The development of a conventional and modern army cannot be separated from consolidating and building up the rear area in every respect... One of the basic requirements we must meet while carrying out the task of building up the army and consolidating the national defense system is establishing the correct relationship between the defense of the nation and the economy."(10)

Under the light of the resolutions of the Party Central Committee, developing upon the revolutionary thinking and the military thinking set forth by President Ho and the party during the previous periods, and on the basis of summarizing the experiences of the revolution in southern Vietnam, the General Military Party Committee Conference (enlarged) in March 1959 and, in particular, the Central Military Party Committee Conference in November 1964 established our party's people's war viewpoint. "The people's war viewpoint is the most basic viewpoint in the military line of our party. The preparations for the armed uprising during World War II and the August general uprising clearly were carried out by all the people. The war of resistance waged by our people against the war of aggression of the old style colonialism of the French imperialists and the U.S. interventionists as well as the liberation war waged by our people in southern Vietnam against the special war of the neo-colonialism of the U.S. imperialists were both people's wars. If the U.S. imperialists unleash a war of aggression and attack northern Vietnam, even though the conditions of warfare will reflect new developments, for us, this war to defend the fatherland will still fully reflect the nature of the people's war, the people's war under modern conditions."(11)

The above mentioned fundamentals of the line and viewpoint of the party determined the content and new development of local military activities in this period.

To begin with, the party clearly established the position and role of the militia, the self-defense forces, and the masses in launching the people's war, building up the people's armed forces, and consolidating the national defense system. Although the enemy had a very modern military machine and although the war was a very violent one, the war to defend the country which our people waged was still a comprehensive people's war under modern

conditions. The militia and self-defense forces were still the key forces in the movement of all of the people fighting the enemy, still the basic force of the people's armed forces and the strategic force of the people's war.

The buildup of the reserve forces and military recruiting became a basic task of local military activities. Once comprised primarily of infantry units, our army developed more and more modern branches and services. An army comprised of modern ground units, a modern air force, and a modern navy naturally must have a source of new recruits. The voluntary military service system of the previous period was replaced by the military draft. Defending the fatherland was the sacred obligation of each citizen. By implementing the military draft, our army was supplemented with young forces each year. Our national defense system was constantly accumulating a reserve force of sufficient size, of good health, a force with certain academic and technical qualifications, a force trained in military affairs and politics, a force ready to meet the requirements of the continuous development of the army. As a result, when the entire country became involved in the war and the task of resisting the United States for national salvation became the foremost task, the wartime mobilization of manpower was carried out smoothly and achieved very large results.

Building, consolidating, and developing the strength of the rear area: the victory at the frontlines and the combat strength of the armed forces originate in the line of the party and are based on a rear area strong in every respect. Therefore, regularly building and consolidating the rear area to make it strong in every respect in order to be ready to fully utilize the moral and material strength of the rear area in support of the frontlines was one of the foremost factors which determined the victory of the war. Building a rear area which is strong politically, economically, militarily, and culturally was the common responsibility of all echelons and sectors. The local armed forces had to heighten their level of combat readiness in order to defend the locality and the fatherland while actively participating in economic construction and the construction of the political base within the locality and carrying out each program and policy of the party and state well. Reality increasingly raised the requirement, task, and measure of closely coordinating local economic development with the consolidation of the national defense system on the local level.

Properly implementing the policies concerning the defense of the country and the rear area policies concerning the army and the local armed forces: this was a task of great political significance. To launch the people's war on a large scale and continuously mobilize forces for the army, it was necessary to adopt specific policies, especially policies concerning wounded veterans, the families of war dead, and families with military personnel fighting far away. The good implementation of these policies truly allowed the soldiers and cadres of the armed forces to engage in combat without having to worry about their families. At the same time, it effectively maintained the standard of living of military dependents and created the conditions for them and the people to enthusiastically accelerate production, consolidate the rear area, and continue to help build up the army and support the frontlines.

Because of the position of local military activities, because each province and municipality was a basic strategic unit of the people's war, and because each province and municipality had the military mission of defending the locality and had a task to perform for the entire country, the provincial and municipal military units became provincial and municipal military commands. This was a very important step in streamlining the organization of leadership, supervision, and command in order to upgrade local military activities to a higher level of development.

The high level development of the people's war on a nationwide scale together with the brilliant achievements of socialist construction in northern Vietnam under wartime circumstances created strong factors and favorable conditions for the various localities to prepare to carry out the historic revolutionary and military tasks of 1975 in the best possible manner. In late 1974, in keeping with the resolution passed by the Political Bureau concerning the revolutionary situation and task in face of the great opportunity which existed, local military activities were focused on such important jobs as mobilizing manpower for the army, mobilizing the necessary equipment for the frontlines, maintaining a readiness to fight and defend the locality, and making preparations to carry out each post-war job well. These were the rather complex and large jobs the rear area had to perform for the frontlines in the concluding stage of the war. In only a short period of time, local military activities completed these jobs well, thereby making a worthy contribution to the task of mobilizing all the potential forces of the country to liberate southern Vietnam and complete the national, democratic revolution throughout the country.

Today, in each locality, in each strategic area, everywhere in our country there are powerful forces of the revolutionary war and the political forces and armed forces of the masses. The local army, which consists of the militia and self-defense forces, has become a local combat force capable of conducting independent combat operations on a high level and is truly the nucleus of the movement of all of the people fighting the enemy under modern conditions.

Several Matters Pertaining to the New Task of Local Military Activities

Our army and people recently experienced a period of continuously waging an extremely brave war of liberation and an extremely brave war to defend the country and won extremely great victories of historic and epochal significance. With these victories, our country's revolution entered a new period. The resolution passed by the 24th Party Plenum set forth the strategic task of the revolution in the new period as:

"Endeavoring to build a socialist Vietnamese fatherland which has a modern industry, modern agriculture, strong national defense system, progressive culture and science, and a civilized and happy life." At the same time, the Party Central Committee has set forth the national defense and security task of the entire country in the new period as: "Insuring, on the basis of accelerating the development of the country in every respect, making every effort to build

up the national defense system...,that the country possesses increasingly strong forces which are ready to defeat each attack by aggressors."

The revolutionary line and task and the national defense line and task of the party in the new period have been and are facing local military activities with new requirements and tasks. In the past, local military activities had to concentrate on carrying out the foremost task of mobilizing and arming all the people and developing each manpower and material capability within the locality to support the requirement of launching the people's war in each locality. Today, local military activities must concentrate on performing the central task of building socialism, building the potentials of the country in every respect, and increasing the comprehensive strength of the socialist system as the basis for increasing the strength of the national defense system.

In the process of building each province and municipality into a prosperous and strong locality, it is necessary to closely coordinate economic construction with the consolidation of the national defense system so that each stage in economic development is a stage in the consolidation of the national defense system. In the process of carrying out national defense tasks within the locality, it is necessary to heighten the awareness of the national defense task; closely coordinate the buildup of the militia and self-defense forces into the key force within the locality with being ready to meet the requirements of building up the powerful reserve force of the conventional and modern people's army; closely coordinate the maintenance of order and security in peace time with preparation to prevent war.

To meet the requirements and carry out the tasks mentioned above, we must understand that local military activities--as the name implies--consist of those military activities of the party and state to be carried out in the various localities and in the fields of economics, politics, and culture. They are closely linked to the various mass activities within the locality. They are related to the mobilization of manpower and material and many aspects of the operation of many sectors within the locality. Carrying out military activities within the locality and the various sectors not only has an effect upon the militia and self-defense forces, it also affects all the activities of a locality or sector in many ways. Therefore, only under the direct leadership of the various party committee echelons within the locality can local military activities be carried out well. On the one hand, the party committee echelons' leadership of local military activities must be direct leadership of each activity; on the other hand, this leadership must be provided through other activities and developing the strength of the mass organizations and sectors within the locality in order to stimulate local military activities while developing the key and assault role of the local armed forces in the process of implementing the production plan.

In the new situation, the requirements of the political and ideological education of the local armed forces are designed to gain a thorough understanding of the common task of our army and the specific political task in the locality at this time, gain a clear understanding of the close relation-

ship between economic construction and the consolidation of the national defense system and between production and protecting production, fulfilling the obligations to work and defend the nation, the spirit of collective ownership in productive labor as well as in the training and buildup of one's corps; at the same time, they are designed to deeply imbue each cadre and soldier with the sense of building and defending the country, maintaining his will to fight, and not relaxing his vigilance and showing him his task and duty in the stage of socialist construction throughout the country in order to change his thoughts and actions to be consistent with the new situation.

In addition to intensifying political and ideological educational activities, it is necessary to organize and build up forces well, especially the militia and self-defense forces and the reserve forces at each production, work, and educational unit and installation so that they are of sufficient size, qualitatively strong, and capable of building and defending the country as well as properly implementing the post-war, peace time army rear area policies.

The great victory of the people's war on the local level during the period of the resistance against the United States for national salvation; the achievements which have been recorded in the three revolutions (the production relations revolution, the scientific-technological revolution, and the ideological and cultural revolution) even under the circumstances of the war; the system of small-scale production which is gradually being upgraded to large-scale socialist production with a new organizational structure and new management procedures; and the understanding of the importance of closely linking the development of the country to the defense of the country, the importance of coordinating economic development with the consolidation of the national defense system, which is in the process of being consolidated--all of these things comprise a new, favorable base upon which we can build and organize the armed forces on the local level well. Under present conditions, the militia and self-defense forces are even more closely linked to the organization of production, they are being provided with more modern equipment, and they are being more highly trained. In each strategic area, each province, and each district, everywhere the requirement of closely coordinating the organization of production with the organization of the militia and self-defense forces is met, the two aspects of production and the protection of production, of economic construction and the consolidation of the national defense system on the local level can support and stimulate each other's development.

The strength of the army is dependent upon the strong, stable base of the political system, the socio-economic structure, and the inexhaustible source of reinforcements among the people. As it moves forward to conventionalization and modernization, our army will be in even greater demand of a powerful reserve force. Building a strong reserve force to meet the requirements of building a people's army which has modern ground forces, a modern army, and a modern navy is a constant task of local military activities. Each sector, locality, basic production unit, agency, and school has the responsibility of organizing the registration of reserve forces and managing them in accordance

with the law governing military obligations. All youths of military age have experienced a period of cultivation and training within the socialist school system where there is a close coordination between the education provided by the school and education by the family, between academic education and the gradual learning of universal military knowledge, consequently, they have become familiar with a disciplined and tightly organized style of life. When they join the army in keeping with their military obligation, these youths quickly develop a liking for army life. When they are discharged, although they shift to productive labor, these youths continue to fulfill their military obligation in the reserve force and are managed, educated, and trained by the various sectors of the state and the localities in accordance with the national defense program, thereby creating the conditions for each citizen to develop the necessary military skills. In the case of invasion of the country by an enemy, the reserve forces, including the cadres and soldiers of the modern branches and services, are prepared ideologically and organizationally, prepared in terms of knowledge and the military style of life, can rapidly strengthen the forces of the army. At times when the war develops into heavy fighting, the main force units have forces which can go anywhere and promptly deal decisive blows to the units of the aggressor army partially because, during peace time, the various sectors, mass organizations, and localities made the necessary preparations and organized the best and most rapid possible mobilization and military recruiting drives in accordance with policies and the requirements of the war.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ho Chi Minh: "Ve dau tranh vu trang va luc luong vu trang nhan dan," [The Armed Struggle and the People's Armed Forces], Quan Doi Nhan Dan Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p 13.
2. Ibid., p 128.
3. Ibid., p 83.
4. Ibid., p 75.
5. "Van Kien Dang (1939-1945)" [Party Documents (1939-1945)], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1963, p 213.
6. Ho Chi Minh: "Ve dau tranh...", p 152.
7. Ibid., p 168.
8. Ibid., p 174.
9. Ibid., p 212.
10. The resolution passed by the 12th (enlarged) Party Plenum, March 1957.
11. Central Military Party Committee resolution (November, 1964).